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The quest for ‘security’ and the practices aimed at creating this on a literal and a figurative 
level is a common human striving. The people whom we task and entrust with providing this 
security are increasingly part of a combination of both public police and private security agents. 
Whilst the public police have been the focus of a large body of research, the volume of research 
in the field of private security is relatively thin. Given the robust growth of the private security 
sector in both developed and developing countries, combined with the relative dearth of 
research involving fieldwork in the private security industry, this research aims to fill a part of 
this knowledge gap. Specifically, this dissertation aims to address an even less-investigated 
research question - that of how the providers of private security think about and undertake their 
work of creating ‘security’. In other words, it explores their mentalities. This exploration of the 
mentalities of those who provide private security will be undertaken through an exploratory 
case study, using the concept of nodal governance as the framing analytic. This case study 
focusses on a suburban security company operating in the southern suburbs of Cape Town, 





1.1. An overview of the private security industry 
 
There is a variety of international and nationally-based research that focusses on the 
private security industry. Much of this research points to the need for greater and more 
effective regulation (see for instance, Berg & Nouveau, 2011; Kempa & Singh, 2008; 
Johnston, 1992; Loader & White, 2015; Stenning, 2009; and White, 2010). Other 
studies (see for instance, De Waard, 1999; and Van Steden & Huberts, 2005) focus 
specifically on the size and scope of the industry by providing quantitative data to 
illustrate the proliferation of private security services throughout the world. Still 
others focus on the overlap between the public police and private security and 
elucidate the implications that flow from this overlap. (See, for example, Berndtsson 
& Stern, 2011; Diphoorn & Berg, 2013, and Shearing & Stenning, 1981). 
 
Whatever the focus of the research, one aspect of the private security industry that stands out 
is its burgeoning growth. Both global and local estimates speak to ever-increasing numbers of 
private individuals and business who are utilising the services of private security as opposed to 
sourcing their security needs from the public police. 
 
From a global perspective, Abrahamsen and Williams (2010) cite statistics drawn from various 
scholars across the (first and third) world. A picture emerges of an industry that experiences 
exponential year-on-year growth in terms of the amount of money it generates: 
 
Worldwide the private security industry is valued at over $139 billion, and 
its growth is forecast to continue at an annual rate of 8% to reach $230 
billion in 2015. (Securitas, Annual Report, 2007: 13 in Abrahamsen & 
Williams, 2010: 19).  
 
On a local level, statistics drawn from the Annual General Meeting (AGM) of the Private 
Security Regulatory Authority or PSIRA - (the regulatory body that oversees the industry in 
South Africa) records that in 2007, there were a total of 776 316 registered security officers in 
South Africa (PSIRA, 2007 in Kempa & Singh, 2008: 343). According to the Minutes of the 
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PSIRA AGM Report of 2014/2015, that number increased to 1 979 969. This represents an 
increase of 155% in the number of registered security officers in South Africa over that period.1 
 
This is within the context of the South African economy that has been contracting over the past 
two years, to the point where the country is currently facing a recession and a negative growth 
rate of 0.7% as recorded over the first three months of this year. (Trading Economics, 2017). 
 
Whist these statistics are not completely current (they range between 2006 - 2015), they are 
provided here as an overview of the steep trajectory of the industry on both a global and a local 
level. As mentioned, the industry is burgeoning, both in terms of the number of personnel 
employed, along with the revenues it accumulates. 
 
It is within this context, that is, at the intersection of a shrinking economy alongside the 
concomitant incremental growth of the private security industry that this dissertation is situated.   
 
In many respects, the literature reflects an industry that has been vilified and disdained (White, 
2010), with the notable exception of Stenning (2009). Many people view the buying of security 
as a ‘grudge purchase’ in an industry comprised of ‘operators’ of dubious repute whose 
overriding motive is to provide security for profit and who exclusively provide their services 
to those who have the financial means to pay for it.  In addition, those who sell private security 
are often viewed as capitalising on the public’s fear, whether real or imagined, of falling victim 
to one of a multitude of depredations that are grouped under the umbrella term of ‘crime’. This 
is particularly salient given that the contemporary landscape of crime is becoming increasingly 
complex and delineated by multiple matrices of risk. Furthermore, research has found (Loader 
& White, 2015) that many actors in the private security industry have themselves bought into 
this negative conceptualisation of the ‘doing’ of their work in this industry, feeling morally 
ambiguous about the work that they do and engaging in ways to both ameliorate this ambiguity 
and to strengthen their sense of purpose (Loader, Goold & Thumala, 2014; Thumala, Goold & 
Loader, 2011).  
 
This study aims to explore the mentalities of those who work in the private security industry 
and to examine and discuss the nature and extent of the confluences and the divergences of this 
                                                          
1 Registered security personnel comprise two categories, that is, personnel who are active (employed) 
and those who are inactive (unemployed). The figures quoted here include both categories 
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study’s findings in relation to the scholarly literature that has focussed on the way private 
security actors ‘do’ the work of providing security; and how they think about their work.   
 
1.2. Statement of the research question and its contribution  
 
Besides a few studies that focus on the way private security think about what they do, 
that is, studies that examine their mentalities (See, for instance, Berg, 2010; Diphoorn, 
2013; 2015; 2016; Manzo, 2010; Kempa & Singh, 2008; Rigakos, 2002), not much has 
been written on this topic.  Several scholars who have researched the private security 
industry point out that this area has been under-researched (see, for example, Brodeur, 
2010; Diphoorn, 2013; and Singh & Kempa, 2007). Given the ‘thinness’ of research in 
this industry, coupled with the proliferation of private security when viewed both locally 
(see, for example, Berg, 2010) and transnationally (see, for example, De Waard, 1999), 
this research aims to fill a part of this knowledge gap. It aims to do this through an 
exploration of how the providers of private security think about what they do.  In other 
words, it explores their mentalities in relation to their work.     
 
The relative paucity of research on the private security industry is further foregrounded 
when it is compared to the voluminous research that has been conducted on the public 
police - both nationally and internationally. Many scholars (see, for instance Brodeur, 
2010; Marks, 2004; Shearing, 1992) have mirrored Stenning’s assertion that “…it is now 
almost impossible to identify any function or responsibility of the public police which is 
not, somewhere and under some circumstances, performed by the private police…” 
(2000: 328). 
 
It is in this context of the nature and extent of the overlap between what the public police 
and private security do when providing security, that Stenning makes a pithy observation: 
His 2014 review of Global Policing (Bowling and Sheptycki, 2012) juxtaposes the 
empirical reality of the nature and extent of private security, with an apparent 
concomitant conceptual blindness to it. In other words, he foregrounds the reality of 
private security as ubiquitous, in contradistinction to the lack of conceptual background 
that is manifested by the relatively small body of literature devoted to it, and illustrates 




Furthermore, Singh and Kempa (2007) echo Stenning’s (2000) statement that 
illustrates the overlap of the division of labour in relation to the public police and 
private security, adding that: “the culture of private policing agents has been far less 
fully studied than those of public police officers” (2007: 297).   
 
My study adds to the body of knowledge about the private security industry as it not 
only focusses on the under-researched area of the mentalities of those who work in 
the industry from a global perspective, but because it does so within the South African 
context. Private security in South Africa demonstrates some marked differences when 
compared to the private security industry in other parts of the world: 
 
I learned then and there that [security] was an essential part of South African 
life - a social practice, perhaps a ritual, that is inherent to every type of 
social activity…That…security is ingrained into the daily practices of 
South Africans.…The simple act of driving a car turned into an exhaustive 
series of enforced security measures… (Diphoorn, Ph.D. Thesis, 2013: 3-
4).  
 
Security is a substantial part of the national weltanschauung.  It is within the context 
of the primacy of place that occupies the collective South African consciousness when 
thinking about and operationalising their ‘safety and security’ needs that this study is 
positioned. 
 
1.3. Methods used to answer the research question 
 
The data for this study was gathered using two types of qualitative interviewing within 
the spatial and temporal bounds of a case study. I opted to use nodal governance 
(Johnston & Shearing, 2003) as the analytical framing of this research, as this framing 
gave me the scope to analyse the mentalities of the providers of the private security 
industry without superimposing a normative framework upon the data. This was done 
to minimise the risk my ‘contaminating’ the data through the imposition of any 




The bulk of the data was collected through interviewing ten providers of private 
security services within a suburban security company operating in the southern 
suburbs of Cape Town. This data was augmented with information collected through 
several informal conversational interviews conducted over the course of a day-long 
‘ride-along’ with one of the company’s armed response officers and afforded me the 
opportunity to stop and talk to the guards stationed at several of the company’s sites.  
Both the formal and the informal interviews took place over a four-week period.  
 
1.4. Overview of the rest of the dissertation 
 
Chapter Two maps the scholarly literature on the private security industry.  It 
addresses three broad areas of enquiry. The literature is firstly mapped on an 
international level, before narrowing down to focus on literature pertaining to certain 
countries in Africa and then focussing on South Africa as a specific case. 
 
Chapter Three sets out how the study was implemented and the research design that I 
employed to answer the problem statement (the research question). Much like Chapter 
Two, it is structured from a broad to a narrow focus. That is, it commences with a 
discussion of the paradigm within which the research is positioned, to the instruments 
used to collect the data, along with how this study will arrive at its conclusions. In 
addition, this chapter also examines the advantages and limitations of the research 
design, along with a discussion of the key ethical implications that flow from this type 
of research. 
 
Chapter Four comprises a presentation and discussion of the research findings. It 
foregrounds several themes that recurred throughout the interviews. The thematically 
arranged descriptions and narratives gathered throughout the interviews weave 
together several strands of meaning that, once transcribed and analysed, create a 
picture of the mentalities of those who work in the field of private security in a 
localised, community-based context of Cape Town’s southern suburbs. In addition, 
Chapter Four questions the feasibility of extrapolating global North literature that 
focuses on what private security ‘could and should’ look like and seeks to juxtapose 
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this normative narrative with a global South perspective (albeit a comparatively small 
slice of the ‘research pie’) as represented by the findings of this study.  
 
Chapter Five concludes the dissertation by presenting an overview of the research 
findings.  It will also examine the implications that these findings have, in and of 
themselves, and on portions of the literature on private security. In addition, these 
findings are used as a platform upon which some questions and possible solutions will 






My objective in this chapter has been to furnish an outline of the research through 
providing a synopsis of what each chapter comprises. In the following chapter, I map 
the literature on the private security industry. This mapping is initially focussed on the 
international literature, then on an African perspective, prior to narrowing the focus 






2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter will map the scholarly literature on private security by signposting the 
contributions of the major writers in the field. The literature will address three broad areas of 
enquiry: Firstly, I will focus on how private security is performed and the mentalities that 
underpin this performance. Secondly, I will map the ways in which private security relates to 
other bodies that have a stake in the provision of security through networks and partnerships.  
The third area of enquiry will focus on issues on regulation of the private security industry and 
on topics such as accountability, governance and legitimacy of the industry as a function of 
regulation. I will organise the literature thematically under these three areas of enquiry. 
 
The literature will be mapped on an international basis prior to it being mapped on a national 
basis. This will be done for two reasons.  Firstly, I aim to provide a broad ‘aerial view’ of the 
overall map of the literature from an international perspective, narrowing the focus onto some 
literature that pertains to Africa and then specifically to South Africa, where my research is 
based. The second reason for mapping the literature on the private security industry in South 
Africa separately to the rest of the world is to highlight several salient theoretical and empirical 
differences between the private security industry in South Africa as compared to other parts of 
the world. (See, for instance, Berg, 2010; Diphoorn, 2013; Singh, 2005; Kempa & Singh 2008).  
 
2.1. AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
2.1.1. Private security performance and mentalities 
 
As mentioned in Chapter One, when compared to the literature on the public police, 
the scholarly focus on private security (a focus that only spans the last four decades) 
is relatively thin. Seminal works that focus on the nature and extent of private security 
and its implications for a broad range of societal issues such as considerations around 
legal issues, accountability issues, policy formulation and the impact of private 
security on human rights, raised these types of issues in the 1980’s. (See, for instance, 




In this section, I review the literature on private security written by scholars who have 
viewed the industry from an empirical perspective. The overarching theme is that of 
how private security is operationalised and answers this question by looking at the 
doing of private security in various contexts. It focusses on an intra-organisational 
level, that is, within the bounds of private security companies in and of themselves. It 
is in this context of the performance of the provision of private security that an 
examination of the mentalities highlights the actors’ ways of thinking about and doing 
private security work. The term “mentalities” is used here within the conceptual 
framework as articulated by, amongst others, Bayley and Shearing (2001), Berg 
(2010), Johnston and Shearing (2003) and Stenning (2000).  
 
One of the ways in which the mentalities of the providers of private security has been 
studied is through an ethnographic lens. As Brodeur observes: “…there is little 
fieldwork on private security, although there are reports replete with data on the size 
of the market, its profit margins, and economic projections” (2010: 259).  Given the 
relative dearth of ethnographic studies, a point highlighted by Marks (2004), amongst 
others, those that have looked at private security by engaging with it through the 
medium of intense fieldwork that typifies ethnography, provide an ‘intimate’ view of 
how private security is thought about and done.  
 
For instance, Rigakos (2002) provides an ethnography that examines the “doing” …of 
security work from the perspective of line officers” (Rigakos, 2002: 3, italics in 
original). Rigakos’ work provides a ‘slice of life’ in that it examines the everyday 
practices, views and meanings (in other words, the mentalities) that the employees 
create around their work as private security officers. An example:    
 
It also gets to your head when you spend twelve hours of your day patrolling 
underground lots and shitty stairwells across the city, you only see crap and 
you get crapped on by the dealers, the druggies, the prostitutes…You know, 
you’re on patrol and people think you’re just a wannabe [policeman], or a 




Manzo (2004) also foregrounds the mentalities of private security actors in the 
performance of their duties in shopping malls, one of several ever-expanding areas of 
“mass private property” (Shearing, 1992: 423) that are ubiquitous in many countries. 
 
In addition, several scholars have focussed on the technologies and resources 
employed by the providers of private security. For instance, Brodeur (2010) maps the 
myriad types of technologies offered by the private security industry and provides 
examples, such as video technology and x-ray booths…razor wire and body sensors, 
animals trained for the purposes of locating contraband at borders and airports, and 
alarm systems. Brodeur also tracks the exponential growth in market share of these 
technologies, and notes a marked spike in their proliferation post-9/11 (2010). 
Similarly, Stenning tracks the rise of “techno-domination” (1994: 153) in the private 
security industry and notes the distinction between the technologies available to the 
public police versus those of private security as being that:  
 
 The principal difference between public and private police …lies in the much 
 greater resources available to private police to acquire intrusive technology, and 
 the much greater incentives and opportunities they have to use it (Ibid.).  
 
Further, Shearing and Stenning’s (1983) seminal research focusses on how these 
intrusive technologies (and the mentalities that are associated by private security with 
them) have had a marked deleterious effect on human rights.  
 
Other scholars have quantified the size and the scope of the private security industry. 
For instance, Van Steden & Huberts, (2005) and Morré (2004) have quantified the 
size and scope of the industry in western countries and in twenty-five European Union 
(EU) member states respectively.  De Waard (1999) also quantifies the proliferation 
of private security on a transnational basis. He provides an overview of the size and 
scope of the private security industry across twenty-seven countries. His 
quantification of the private security industry on a multinational basis is rated by him 
as being “The most reliable of the international surveys on the number of public versus 
private police” (Brodeur, 2010: 270). Whilst the numbers may differ according to who 




2.1.2. Private security as it relates to others  
 
In this second area of enquiry, I focus on the literature that examines and 
discusses how private security actors interact with other actors (under both the 
provision of the state and in relation to non-state providers). As mentioned, this 
body of literature focuses on how the actors in the private security industry relate 
to other bodies who have a stake, in some form, in the provision of security. It 
examines the interactions on an inter-organisational platform and thus addresses 
issues on the level of the partnerships and networks that comprise these 
relationships. 
 
A substantial body of literature exists which specifically speaks to the overlap 
of the public police in relation to the providers of private security (see, for 
instance, Bayley & Shearing, 2001; Johnston & Shearing, 2003; Rigakos, 2002; 
Shearing, 1992; Stenning, 2000). This overlap is constituted in multiple ways. 
In other words, to use Johnston and Shearing’s (2003) categorisation, the 
overlap is multifaceted, as it operates on the platform of the similitude of the 
mentalities of the actors in both these fields, as well as the technologies and 
resources employed by both.  Indeed, there are two mentalities prevalent in the 
field of the governance of security: “proactive prevention [and] reactive 
punishment” (Johnston & Shearing, 2003: 16), with the result that: “the 
governance of security is messier than it once was” (Ibid., 17).  
 
Given that the literature speaks to the myriad areas of similitude between the 
public police and private security, Stenning’s (2000: 328) assertion that: “…it 
is now almost impossible to identify any function or responsibility of the public 
police which is not, somewhere and under some circumstances, assumed and 
performed by private police in democratic societies”. Thus, there are many 
actors who perform the work of ‘security’, however, multifaceted and nuanced 
in meaning the term ‘security’ tends to be and notwithstanding the difficulties 
scholars focusing on security governance experience in articulating a precise 
definition of the word security (Zedner, 2003). The point is that there are a 
multitude of actors who undertake the function of policing; where the definition 
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of policing is aligned with that of Shearing’s (1992), namely, that: 
“Policing…refers to the preservation of the peace, that is, to the maintenance of 
doing things where persons and property are free from unwarranted interference 
so that people may go about their business safely” (Shearing, 1992: 399-400).  
 
It is the configuration of a complex network or web of relationships between 
many state and non-state providers of security that gives rise to what Shearing 
terms “the pluralist conception” (Shearing, 1992: 425) regarding the provision 
of security. Similarly, this “pluralisation” (Shearing, 1992: 421) of provision 
reflects a theoretical and empirical shift away from the state as being the sole or 
even the apex actor in the provision of security (Johnston and Shearing, 2003). 
 
Stenning’s 2009 study further refines the concept of the pluralisation and 
overlap that exists between the public police and the private security industry. 
His quotation indicates that it is almost a ‘given’ that this overlap exists; and 
that other factors supra to it render the public police versus private security 
binary as superfluous and redundant. (Ibid., 25). 
 
Indeed, the proliferation of those who seek to provide security is also a function 
of the increased level of both intra-national and supranational crises, whether 
they be environmental (in the case of climate change), or mass migrations of 
refugees or the threat of terrorism and pandemics - all are examples of the 
multiple threats to security and crises that have become not only national, but 
supranational issues. The ‘shrinking’ of the world as a function of the increased 
porosity of national and international borders and the exponential growth of 
technology are among the key drivers resulting in the multi-layered expansion 
of crises that need to be policed (Management Summary: The Police in 
Evolution, 2006: 11). The extensive literature on the “pluralisation” (Shearing, 
1992: 421) of both sets of actors’ roles in the performance of policing and 
governance, again highlights the mutable and amorphous nature of the boundary 
between what the public police do, versus what the actors in the private security 
industry do, particularly given the increasingly complex nature of the harms that 




Further, Crawford (2006b) in his elucidation of consumers who have the buying 
power to subscribe to the ‘club goods’ mentality through their choice of security 
provision, illustrates another example of the nature of private security as being 
a part of a network of actors who all have some stake in the provision of security. 
‘Club goods’ refers to the buying power that essentially gives (affluent) 
consumers in the security market the freedom to assemble a package of security 
(drawing from a combination of state and/or non-state bodies) that is tailored to 
fit their specific set of needs. This ‘bespoke’ security solution grants those who 
can afford it membership to a club, one that excludes those who cannot afford 
to pick, choose and purchase private security in this way. Put differently, the 
notion of the public good of private security is circumscribed given the 
economic barriers to entry into this club in that one’s membership depends on 
one’s socio-economic status. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the ‘plural’ nature of security has key implications for 
human rights. One of the main implications is that of the exclusionary nature of 
private security. In this vein, Leman-Langlois and Shearing (2009) map the 
challenges that the increasing security armoury - in both a literal and a figurative 
sense - presents to the protection of human rights. They also outline strategies 
to bolster these rights in the face of this increasingly ‘securitised’ landscape.  
 
In line with a focus on the social as opposed to the economic implications that 
flow from the pluralisation of security provision, Jones and Newburn (1998) 
examine the relational implications that result from the provision of security 
delivered by both the public police and by private security in the United 
Kingdom (UK). They look at the forms and degree of partnerships and co-
operation (and lack thereof) between private security and the public police. 
Their research furnishes further evidence of the increasingly permeable 
boundaries between public policing and the private security industry and 
examines the degrees of connection (and disconnection) of the broad range of 
organisations that constitute the remit of policing. 
 
Several other scholars have also examined and discussed the relational dynamics 
between the public police and private security. For instance, Manzo, (2010) and 
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Berndtsson and Stern’s (2011) research foreground two predominant relational 
modes between the public police and private security: “…a model that 
emphasises either a competitive or a collaborative relationship” (Diphoorn & 
Berg, 2013: 1). However, the latter propose a different relational model to make 
sense of the public police/private security relationship, one that proposes that 
the public police/private security dyad contains elements of both competition 
and collaboration. This research focuses on patterns of policing partnership in 
South Africa and will be unpacked in greater detail under the South African 
literature section of this chapter. 
 
In sum, “The idea that the public police no longer (if they ever did) have a 
monopoly over policing provision has now become a truism” (Bayley & 
Shearing, 1996:22 in Stenning 2009:22) has become an overarching tenet 
throughout the literature on the provision of security. 
 
Dupont (2004) adds to the pluralisation conversation and eschews the 
problematisation of the binary distinction of the state versus the non-state in the 
provision of security.  Instead, in Security in the Age of Networks (2004) he 
refines the concept of plurality within the field of security by focussing on the 
range of networked configurations that provide security and that draw on both 
state and private auspices and actors. In other words, his position illustrates the 
existence of a range or network of actors who provide policing and security 
governance from the perspective of a “nodal framework [of] the governance of 
security” (Johnston and Shearing, 2003:151). This demonstrates that the 
scholarly literature on private security is heading off in a new direction - one 
that explores the networks of relationships that exist between private security 
and other players (both state and non-state) in the field of the provision of 
security. 
 
2.1.3. Regulation of the private security industry 
 
This third area of enquiry focuses on the literature that addresses the issue of 
how the ‘node’ (Johnston and Shearing, 2003) of private security is regulated 
within itself, and, in addition, how is it regulated in relation to other bodies that 
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have a stake in the provision of security. This will comprise a discussion of the 
body of literature that focuses on a synthesis of the first two areas of enquiry in 
that it addresses questions, it examines regulation on both an intra- and an inter-
organisational level.  
 
This section will also include an examination of and a discussion around the 
reality of the degree of regulation of the industry in various countries and from 
various theoretical, analytical, operational and empirical viewpoints. The nature 
and the extent of regulation of any industry has several implications for how 
accountable that industry is, and to whom it is accountable. Accountability as a 
function of the regulation of the private security industry will thus also be 
examined in this section.  Many scholars have focussed on regulatory 
issues when mapping the private security  literature. The regulatory lens 
foregrounds normative issues pertaining to how and what shape the regulation 
of the industry should take. White (2010) defines regulation in relation to the 
private security industry along two dimensions, those he terms the “reformers” 
and the “re-legitimators” in this way: 
 
For the reformers [those who seek to ‘clean-up’ the industry] regulation 
provides a mechanism through which to shape the activities of the private 
security industry. For the re-legitimators, [those who seek to align private 
security with the state] regulation provides a mechanism through which to 
capture the much-needed resource of legitimacy from the state, thereby 
enhancing the attractiveness of their services in the security sector market 
place (White, 2010: 17). 
 
Further, Braithwaite argues that: “Efficacious regulation should speak to the 
diverse objectives of regulated firms, industry associations, and individuals 
within them” (1992:4). Given the often-tremendous degree of power - both 
symbolic and literal - (Stenning, 2009) vested in those who are mandated either 
through state or non-state auspices to maximise social order and minimise harms 
in the lives of citizens, the issue of the regulation (and its implications) forms 




Looking to the literature on the nature and extent of regulation of the private 
security industry on an international platform, White, 2010; Button, 2007b; and 
Prenzler and Sarre, 2007; trace the trajectory of the regulation of the industry in 
the UK, Europe and Australia respectively.  They map the processes resulting 
in an increasingly regulated private security industry in these places that 
comprise both global North and global South domains. All three of these 
scholars emphasise the importance of regulating processes through state 
legislation; where state legislation is used to create a ‘best-practice’ model 
through adherence to legislated industry governance standards.   
 
In contradistinction to this trend of increasing regulation as described here, 
Manning asserts that the United States (US) exhibits a different trend: “There is 
very little perceived competition, tension or concern about the growth or size of 
private policing in America… They are legitimate but relatively unregulated” 
(Manning, 2006: 111 in White, 2010: 183). Manning attributes this to “…the 
deeply embedded capitalist free-market ideology which seems to permeate most 
aspects of American life, including the domestic security sector” (Ibid.). He thus 
highlights the correlation between de-regulation and a neoliberal ideology and 
practice where the market takes primacy over all else in relation to issues of 
regulation. This primacy of the market has key implications for those who work 
in the South African private security industry. These implications will be 
discussed in Chapters Four and Five.   
 
Further, Zedner (2006) focusses on the implications that flow from a regulatory 
framing of private security in commercial terms, wherein profit trumps people’s 
civil rights. Her framing of an ‘unholy alliance’ of a state that ‘pimps’ out private 
security as hired guns to those who can pay for it highlights the deleterious 
impact on the rights of the individual that a strictly transactional, business model 
tends to foster. Other scholars have also focussed on regulatory factors and their 
implications, given the ever-broadening spectrum of both the responsibilities 
and the spaces wherein private security is tasked to operate. (See, for instance, 




In sum, the nature and extent of the regulatory practices of various countries can 
be plotted along a ‘continuum’. The myriad social, economic and political 
implications that flow from these calibrations of regulation of the industry all 
give rise to questions that are salient within these spheres of human existence.  
 
The regulation of the private security industry in South Africa will be discussed 
further in this chapter, along with a focus on some key implications of the 
current status of regulation of the industry in this country. This will link with an 
examination in Chapters Four and Five of the effects of regulation on the people 
of South Africa, in addition to the effects on those who work in the industry. 
 
2.1.4. Governance in relation to the private security industry  
 
Johnston and Shearing (2003) and Wood and Shearing (2007) both define the 
concept of governance as a system designed to order the flow of events in 
peoples’ lives with the objective of providing maximum security and a 
concomitant minimisation of the risk of harms befalling people. These scholars 
posit a system of “nodal governance” (Johnston & Shearing, 2003: 145) to 
accomplish this objective. This concept of governance will now be discussed, 
along with two others that still have traction in the contemporary security 
governance landscape. These three frameworks that conceptualise governance 
are broadly outlined here to provide a picture of the role and reach of the state 
(and, by extension the reach of the state-mandated public police) and the 




2.1.5. The legacy of Thomas Hobbes - The state as the only actor 
 
Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651) remains a tenacious symbol of the abiding notion of 
a centralised (that is, a state-centred) hierarchically-ordered configuration of 
security governance. In addition, it underscores the longevity of the belief that 
a state-centred configuration of governance is in some way preferable to, or 
superior over, a polycentric (Ostrom, 1961) or plural configuration; that is, one 
in which many actors (both state and non-state) participate in the provision of 
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security. The monocentric model views the public police as the sole arbiters and 
enforcers of law and order and as the only legitimate organ through which the 
state can ensure the safety of its citizenry.  
 
2.1.6. State-anchored pluralism - the state as the apex actor  
 
Following on and in line with the above, Loader and Walker (2007) argue that 
whilst security can, indeed, should be “pluralized” (Stenning, 2009: 22) in that 
it incorporates both state and non-state actors, the state can, indeed, should be 
the primary actor in this configuration of security governance. They argue that 
as the primary actor, the state’s role and reach involves “the democratic state 
[having] a necessary and virtuous part to play in seeking to realize the good of 
security…” (2007:4). Their conceptualisation of a state anchored pluralism 
(Ibid.,195) places the state at the front and centre of the ordering of the 
governance of security. The position taken here is that the state has the capacity 
to achieve public goods in the provision of security.  
 
2.1.7. Nodal governance - the state as one actor amongst many  
 
Other scholars who have looked at the provision of public goods, such as 
Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren, (1961) do not dismiss the state, they merely view 
the state as one of many actors in the provision of both tangible and intangible 
goods and services.  In other words, the view of plural providers of security 
governance is one that is characterised by the devolution of power to other actors 
in a participatory and decentralised fashion that maximises accountability and 
responsibility whilst minimising the potential for abuse of ultimate power 
flowing from an omnipotent (state) actor. 
 
This notion of local provision of security dovetails with the nodal concept of 
governance as also postulated by, for instance, Bayley and Shearing (2001) Berg 
(2015) Johnston and Shearing (2003) and Wood and Shearing (2007). Broadly 
speaking, the nodal concept has some deep roots in Hayekian theory. Whilst an 
exposition of the fullness of Hayek’s theory is outside of the scope of this 
dissertation, suffice it to say that “knowledge…never exists in concentrated or 
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integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits of knowledge which all the 
separate individuals [in a society] possess” (Hayek, 1945: 1). This idea of 
knowledge (whether in the ambit of economics, or in line with this dissertation, 
in relation to the provision of security) as being a composite and a function of 
the many as opposed to the exclusive domain of a single entity (such as ‘the 
state’) is foundational to some of the key tenets of nodal governance as being 
key to the efficient and effective provision of security. Further, Burris, Drahos 
and Shearing (2005) focus on this subject and provide case studies that illustrate 
the varying degrees of democracy and transparency that may or may not accrue 
to this nodal configuration.  
 
Put differently, a centralised system of governance embodied by the state is too 
far away (literally and figuratively) from the localised needs of particular 
communities in specific contexts to be able to adequately and efficiently meet 
those needs.  In broad terms and in relation to private security, this translates 
into the state not being able to accurately assess the needs of localised 
communities regarding their security needs, let alone being able to resource 
them.  It is as a solution to this sense of a monolithic and cumbersome state that: 
“[The] nodal account recognizes networks, partnerships, markets and states as 
sources of governance and locates such sources within a field of organizational 
nodes” (Wood & Shearing, 2007:  11).2 
 
2.1.8. Legitimacy and (in)security in relation to the private security industry 
 
Issues of legitimacy that accrue to the private security industry considers how 
each of the themes presented in this literature review speak to the industry’s 
‘lawfulness’ from the viewpoint of the providers of private security in relation 
to themselves, to the public police and to the general public. Put differently, 
issues around the degree of legitimacy that the providers of private security have 
                                                          
2 Nodal governance is the analytic framework within which this dissertation is positioned. In 
addition, the underlying tenets of the nodal position in relation to the governance of security 





in relation to one other (that is, between security companies), secondly, between 
the providers of private security and the public police and lastly, between that 
private security industry and the public are the next focus area. 
 
The research of Prenzler and Sarre (2007) and White (2010) are two examples 
of literature that examine legitimacy in the private security industry, an industry 
that was initially vilified and looked down upon, and rose to occupy a position 
of equality with the public police through being conferred with the “element of 
statehood” (White, 2010: 180). These authors view legitimacy as a function of 
industry regulation. This alignment with and endorsement by the state harks 
back to both Hobbes and state-anchored pluralism as outlined in the previous 
discussion on governance. In the former, the state has a priori legitimacy 
because it is the state.  In the latter, that is, the notion of the state as anchor, there 
exists a positive correlation between state endorsement and legitimacy. 
 
Some of the questions to be considered in relation to this theme are highlighted 
through the literature: What confers legitimacy on the actors in this industry?  
This question can be asked in relation to each of the preceding themes: For 
instance, given the “pluralization of security provision” (Stenning, 2009: 22) - 
do the public police confer legitimacy on the private security industry? Or is the 
position the other way around?  Or when focussing on the global North 
literature, is legitimacy in the industry a function of a democratic meeting of 
broad-based community needs and the subsequent fulfilment of public interests 
that may flow from it? (Loader and Walker, 2007). Or is it a function of the 
regulatory structures that seek to professionalise the industry with the objective 
on placing it ‘on par with’ the legitimacy enjoyed (in certain countries) in 
relation to the state and the public police? (White, 2010).  
 
A section of the literature that focusses on legitimacy of the private security 
industry is informed by research that asserts that the actors in this field feel 
compelled to ‘justify’ their position in relation to their work.  In a study 
undertaken by Löfstrand, Loftus & Loader (2015;1), the research findings 
indicate “that the occupational culture of security officers enhances self-esteem 
by infusing security work with a sense of purpose” and that they “… Employ a 
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range of strategies to deflect scorn and reframe their work as important and 
necessary”. It is within this context that Loader and White (2015), Loader, 
Goold and Thumala (2014) and Thumala, Goold and Loader (2011) examine the 
various ‘legitimating practices’ that the providers of private security engage in 
to increase their esteem both in their own eyes and in the eyes of society.  Their 
research indicates that the mentalities of the actors in the private security 
industry is characterised by a “physical taint”, a “social taint” and a “moral 
taint”. (Löfstrand, Loftus & Loader, 2015: 3, italics in original). 
 
Loader and Walker (2007) further demonstrate the correlation between 
legitimacy of the private security industry and the state by linking it with the 
proposal that private security can and should be a public good driven under the 
auspices of the state. Furthermore, Loader, White and Thumala (2014) argue 
that viewing security provision in a commodified way, as something that is 
bought and sold in relation to the sole driving force of market factors, is only 
one part of a bigger picture.  The latter view the “buying and selling of security 
[as being] a morally charged and contested practice of governance” (Loader, 
White & Thumala, 2014: 469).  They argue that the common method of 
analysing private security industry is predominantly understood through a focus 
on economics. They propose that this sole focus on the market of private security 
provision through an economic lens fails to address issues of the “unease and 
ambivalence” (Ibid., 470) that adheres to both the buyers and the sellers of 
private security as illustrated by the legitimating practices referred to in the 
previous paragraph.  
 
Loader and Walker’s (2007) thesis that the provision of private security can be 
mobilised for the good of all in society is one that can (and should) be imagined, 
and can (and should) be operationalised. One of the key questions asked by these 
authors is: “Can one create institutions [private security companies] with the 
capacity to regulate the trade in protective products not just ‘for efficiency’ 
(Radin, 1996:108), but in order to give effect to and protect the full range of 
social and political values upon which markets for security impinge?” (Loader, 




In short, Loader and White (2015) posit that private security can and should be 
democratically provided. The position they take in their 2015 paper highlights 
their belief that a market economy is not a sufficient condition for the provision 
of private security, as economics prevents vast swathes of (poor) populations 
from accessing the goods and services provided by private security.  
 
This concludes the review of the literature that focusses on private security from 
an international perspective. The following section of the literature review will 
narrow the focus through mapping the literature that pertains to Africa.  
 
2.2. AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE, WITH A FOCUS ON SOUTH AFRICA 
 
2.2.1. Private security performance and mentalities 
 
The focus will now shift to the global South literature, with a specific focus on 
the African perspective. As mentioned at the outset of this Chapter, this will 
comprise a separate section of the literature review given the salient differences 
between the way security is performed in Africa in comparison to how it is 
performed in the rest of the world (see, for instance, Diphoorn, 2013). 
 
Kempa and Singh’s (2007) research on the mentalities of the providers of private 
security in South Africa describes those mentalities as being characterised by a 
coercive, exclusionary and racist way of thinking and doing that illustrates the 
exclusion of most of the population in favour of the inclusion of the few. This 
coercive, exclusionary and racist mentality is underscored by further studies by 
these scholars (Singh, 2005; Singh and Kempa, 2007) wherein the ubiquitous, 
plural nature of private security in South Africa along with a mentality that they 
describe as militaristic is examined and discussed. The military mentality is one 
that they view as orientated towards punishment, coercion and racism. 
 
As we have argued, between the two [public policing and private security] 
there are elements of both convergence and complementarity; together, 
troublingly, they add up to an increasingly coherent security regime that 
both reflects and amplifies some of the most disturbing aspects of the 




They further discuss the negative implications that this mentality has for the 
freedom and fundamental rights of the individual (especially those who are 
poor). 
 
Further, Kempa and Singh (2008) focus on the issue of what policing means in 
post-apartheid South Africa, and they track the developments from the 
viewpoint of the resources (both human and inanimate) and the technologies 
utilised under the relatively young South African democracy post-1994. As 
mentioned, they argue that the literal and figurative threat of the use of coercive 
and punitive techniques in the governance of harms parallels much of the human 
rights abuses that occurred under the political hegemony of the pre-democratic 
Nationalist Party government in South Africa.  The trend of the private security 
industry in South Africa to ‘regress’ to restriction, punishment, limitation and 
proscription in the governance of harms speaks to a coercive mentality that is 
operationalised through the employment of resources and technologies (Marks, 
2004; Singh, 2008).  This mentality is further elucidated in Singh’s (2005) 
paper, in which she highlights the use of coercive practices in the governance of 
harms in addition to the shaping of behaviour to conform with the hegemonic, 
normative narrative of what constitutes societally-sanctioned ‘good orderly 
conduct’ (Marks, 2007; Singh, 2005).   
 
Berg (2010) further articulates the relationship between the space to be governed 
- that is, the context wherein private security performs its operations; in relation 
to the ways in which they think about what they do as impacting upon and 
informing how they go about doing it. In other words, her 2010 paper illustrates 
how different resources and technologies used in different contexts inform the 
mentalities of the providers of private security in different ways. Her paper 
delineates three different South African contexts wherein private security 
operates within the remit of “governing security” (Johnston and Shearing, 2003: 
12) and demonstrates how the different range of resources and technologies that 
flow from these mentalities inform the way in which the provision of security is 
accomplished. Put differently, the mentalities of the providers of private security 
are informed by a way of thinking and doing that is often context-dependent. 
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The upshot of this is that the mentality of private security is oftentimes a 
function of who is to be policed as much as where this policing takes place 
(Berg, 2010). 
 
Diphoorn (2013) provides an ethnographic view of the way armed reaction 
officers in the private security industry undertake what she describes as their 
“performances” (2013:234) and the meanings they ascribe to what they do and 
how they do it. In addition, Diphoorn examines how (predominantly white) 
affluent South Africans construct the dominant theme of crime as being 
perpetrated by a criminal who is typified as black, male, young and poor. The 
notion of the social construction of reality is foregrounded in her work as a self-
perpetuating notion that is not a fixed immutable reality, but is woven into the 
narrative of the lives of middle- and upper-class South Africans and is 
perpetuated through a series of literal and figurative iterations. This is further 
elaborated through her assertion that: “…race is a social construction that is 
generated, moulded, and reified through social practices” (2015:4).  
 
2.2.2. Private security as it relates to others  
 
Abrahamsen and Williams (2011) highlight the theoretical and empirical 
realities of the providers of private security through what they term the “global 
security assemblages” (Abrahamsen & Williams 2011:122) that have been 
formed to protect key national resources on the African continent. Their case 
studies illustrate how the binary between state and non-state providers of 
security no longer has overriding theoretical traction nor the state/non-state 
binary the prevailing empirical reality. Instead, they look at the range of actors 
who form part of the complex of the provision of security. Albrecht and Moe 
(2014) expand on this notion of a complex of security provision through their 
focus on a conceptual framing of the provision of security in terms of 
“hybridity” (2014:1) wherein they trace the contours of the complex web formed 
by state and non-state actors in this landscape. Both sets of authors cited here 
focus on Africa. They do so in the context of “limited statehood” (Börzel & 
Risse, 2015:1) and states that are characterised as fragile and/or failing on the 
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African continent (Börzel and Risse, 2010; 2015) from the standpoint of 
governance.  
 
In addition to the global South literature on the topic of the blurring of the 
state/non-state boundaries as examined and discussed by Abrahamsen and 
Williams (2011) and Albrecht and Moe (2014) there are several key scholars 
who speak to the state/non-state overlap and the consequent theoretical and 
empirical reality of “the contemporary pluralised landscape” (Diphoorn & Berg, 
2013: 1). It is to this topic that I now turn.  
 
2.2.3. Plural policing in South Africa  
 
Many scholars have focussed partnerships and plural policing configurations in 
South Africa. Some seminal works are those of Baker (2002), Berg (2004), 
Bénit-Gbaffou (2013), Marks (2007) and Minnaar (2005). All focus on the 
nature and the extent of partnerships in policing though an examination of the 
various partnerships (or lack thereof) between agglomerations constituted by 
coalitions between the public police, private security and/or civil society. In 
relation to the empirical reality of the overlap between what the public police 
and the private police ‘do’ in that private security “increasingly also engages in 
law enforcement duties in public spaces” (Berg, 2010: 289), the state of the 
partnership appears to be somewhat fractious at times: 
 
…against the backdrop of the existing high levels of crime in South Africa 
where the state law enforcement and policing agencies are 
understaffed…and overworked, it stands to reason that any assistance 
…[that] the private security industry can render would be welcomed. 
Unfortunately, this has not always been the case in South Africa (Minnaar, 
2005: 85). 
 
In addition, Diphoorn and Berg (2013) focus on the nature and extent of the 
links between private security and the South African Police Services (the SAPS) 
and they characterise the types and degrees of cooperation and coordination that 
exists between private security and the public police. Diphoorn and Berg (2013) 
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identify and discuss various relational modalities that exist between the 
providers of private security and the public police and map the six stages that 
typify the evolution of the relationship between the public police and private 
security as proposed by Stenning (1989).  They conclude that: “A main 
difference between…forms of partnering concerns the policing mentality that 
steers these practices” (Diphoorn & Berg, 2013: 15). This again speaks to how 
perception (both of oneself and the other) is key in shaping the way private 
security is both thought about and operationalised. 
  
In summary, many scholars have focussed on the negative effects that the 
mentalities that prevail in the private security industry have on (especially) the 
poorest and most vulnerable members of South African society. This last section 
has sought to highlight the similarly deleterious effects of the various 
agglomerations of power that comprise plural policing. Put differently, it 
examines the threats that these alliances, regardless of their particular 
governance configuration; pose to human rights.  
 
It is to issues of regulation of the private security industry in South Africa that I 
now turn.  
 
2.3. Regulation of the private security industry  
 
In relation to an examination of how the node as postulated by Johnston and Shearing 
(2003) of private security is regulated within itself, and how is it regulated in relation to 
other bodies that have a stake in the provision of security, Berg and Nouveau (2011) map 
three phases of regulation of the private security industry in South Africa. They track the 
evolution of industry regulation from the “The first phase - apartheid-era regulation” 
(2011: 25) through to the Private Security Industry Regulation Act 56 of 2001 (‘The Act’) 
that was promulgated post-apartheid.  In so doing, they map out the regulatory 
recalibrations pre- and post-apartheid by tracking the changes in legislation of the 
industry in South Africa within the pre- and post-1994 context and the concomitant 
changing political dispensation.  
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The Act as it currently contemplated speaks to a state-centred set of rules regulating the 
private security industry. This normative ‘top-down’ legislation exemplifies the state’s 
position as an ‘anchoring mechanism’, in as much as it provides a set of instructions for 
how private security will be regulated under state auspices. This positioning of The Act 
has several implications, the main one as outlined here:     
 
A major implication of this legislation that maps out the regulation and governance of 
the private security industry in South Africa has several knock-on effects that are not 
conducive to fostering and protecting the public good. This means that The Act views 
private security as a commodity that can be bought and sold, and it is relatively silent on 
the notion of private security as a public good that encompasses the key concepts of the 
equitable provision of security that is responsive to the needs of the people it serves. In 
other words, the current state of regulation and governance of the private security 
industry in South Africa as contemplated by The Act is succinctly summed up thus:  
“The root of the problem is the fact that the current regulatory system, and 
specifically PSIRA, [Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority] is, in 
practice, ‘…a business regulation model rather than a model of public 
service governance’” (Stenning, 2009: 22-23, in Berg & Nouveau, 2011: 
28).  
 
In summary, the regulation of the private security industry in South Africa, as 
contemplated by the legislation and the promulgation of the Private Security Industry 
Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) is founded upon and operationalised through economic 
drivers.  Whilst one of the major implications of the industry regulator as being market-
driven and market-focussed has already been discussed in the previous paragraph, there 
are several others that have a marked impact on the mentalities of the providers of private 
security in South Africa. These effects will be unpacked and discussed in tandem with 
the research findings and a discussion of these findings in Chapter Four of this 





2.3.1. Weighing up legitimacy of the saps versus that of private security 
 
As discussed earlier in this Chapter, the literature in relation Europe, Australia 
and the UK (see, for example, Button, 2007b; Prenzler and Sarre 1998 and 
White, 2010) flows from state-sanctioned regulation, wherein the enactment of 
regulation and governance activities aim to bring a former disdained industry 
into a space where they are ‘legal’, and essentially, where they ‘belong’.  In 
other words, legitimacy denotes a sense of ‘lawfulness’ and of ownership of 
praxis and agency within the remit of the provision of private security to the 
extent that it is endorsed by the state (White, 2010).  
 
However, the situation in South Africa is somewhat different, in that the SAPS 
are ‘legitimate’, regardless of their ‘uselessness.’ Several scholars, such as 
Bradford et al., (2014), Minnaar (2010) and Shaw (2002) have focussed on the 
nexus between the SAPS’s legitimacy as being a coefficient of their 
effectiveness. In other words, in South Africa the test of the public police’s 
legitimacy is not the measured according to their ability to manifest justice or 
parity, it is their effectiveness as crime fighters that counts.    
Berg (2010), Cooper-Knock (2016), Diphoorn (2013) and Marks (2007) have 
also addressed the question of what legitimacy in relation to the governance of 
security in South Africa looks like. These authors examine whether the 
resources and technologies that are employed by private security, such as their 
weaponry, their uniforms and insignia, and their emulation of the other trappings 
of the public police furnish them with a sense of legitimacy, particularly in 
relation to these being the necessary accoutrements (in their eyes, as much as in 
the eyes of others) in their role as crime fighters. 
Further, the lack of legitimacy of the police in post-1994 South Africa is 
illustrated by Cooper-Knock (2016). Citizens who fall prey to crime are apt to 
view the police as being the ‘last port of call’ (recall Johnston and Shearing’s 
(2003) description of the public police’s reactive (as opposed to a proactive, 




Diphoorn (2103) also speaks to issues of legitimacy as being key to the 
mentalities of those who work as providers of private security. Indeed, one of 
the themes of her 2013 ethnography is that the private security industry is 
constantly negotiating and re-negotiating its space in respect to its clients, the 
state and with the various non-state bodies with which it interfaces.  The sense 
of a constantly-changing terrain that shapes the mentalities of those who work 
in the industry is summed up in the closing lines of her thesis, when she asks an 
armed reaction officer what he actually does.  His response is telling:  
 
I just try to help people, but it’s not easy. All this crime, this violence. It’s 
pretty damn dark, and there is not a lot of light to guide us. We do what the 
police do, but we’re not them. We are somewhere halfway (Diphoorn, 
2013:  277). 
 
However, in the South African context, the question is whether the SAPS have 
ever enjoyed a broad base of legitimacy in relation to those whom they are 
mandated to police. This in turn begs the question of whether private security 




My objective in this Chapter has been to provide an overview of what scholars have 
written on the topic of private security from a global perspective. Thereafter I narrowed 
the focus down to literature pertaining to private security on the African continent, before 
bringing the focus onto the South African literature in particular.  
 
The following chapter, Chapter Three, looks at the methods and the means of data 
analysis I employed to answer the research question. 
Thereafter, in Chapter Four, I will present and discuss my research findings flowing from 
the data array that was formulated on the back of the collection and analysis of the raw 




Chapter Five concludes this dissertation and will examine issues related to factors 
conducive to how plural policing arrangements may be reconfigured as public goods; 
where the public police no longer have the monopoly on policing.  Secondly, it will 
examine and discuss some key effects that the current state of private security may have 
on moulding the mentalities of those who work in it. Thirdly, it will look at some 
normative issues with respect to the accountability that currently accrues to the private 
security industry, and it asks what changes could be made to ensure a more democratic 




3. RESEARCH METHODS 
 
3.1. AN OVERVIEW 
 
This chapter is divided into six sections. In the first section, I will discuss the 
paradigmatic lens through which I have chosen to answer the research question. A 
paradigm, or worldview, is described as an “accepted model or pattern” that represents 
the “deepest set of beliefs about how the world works.” (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2004). 
A paradigm embraces a particular epistemological position, that is, a ‘way of knowing 
things’; in addition to a particular ontological framework, that is, ‘what the nature of 
the world, or reality, is’. 
 
The second section will comprise a discussion of the analytical framework within 
which this research is situated, that is, the analytic of “nodal security governance” as 
espoused by Johnston & Shearing, 2003; Dupont, 2004; and Wood &Shearing, 2006; 
amongst several other scholars. 
 
In the third section, I will outline the research design by providing a broad outline of 
how the research was implemented.  
 
The fourth section provides an examination and discussion of the methods that I have 
employed to answer the research question. In short, two types of qualitative 
interviewing techniques will be detailed in this section; along with a justification for 
the employment of these specific variants of qualitative interviews.  
 
The fifth section will examine and discuss some of the key challenges and limitations 
that accrue to this type of research, coupled with a discussion of the ways in which I 
have attempted to ameliorate the impact of these factors on the quality of my research 
findings. 
 
In the sixth section, I provide an examination and discussion of the ethical 
considerations to which this research gives rise, along with a focus on the steps I 
employed to ensure that I have complied with a sound set of principles qua the ethics 




3.2. THE RESEARCH PARADIGM 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the use of one specific lens as opposed to the use of 
other paradigmatic lenses when undertaking research has key implications for the 
production of knowledge within the ambit of scholastic research. Traditionally, the 
binary notion held that the quantitative method of knowledge production was the 
research paradigm employed within the natural sciences, whilst the production of 
knowledge through research in the realm of the social sciences was undertaken 
through the qualitative paradigm (Bryman, 1988). In other words, the traditional 
characterisation of the ‘opposing’ paradigms emphasised a difference between 
quantitative, positivistic, deductive methods of knowledge production employed by 
researchers in the natural sciences; as opposed to the qualitative, interpretivist, 
inductive methods of knowledge production that are largely associated with research 
in the social sciences (Bryman, 1988)  
 
A detailed mapping of the above discussion reaches into the realm of the philosophy 
of science and is outside the purview of this dissertation. Suffice it to say that in this 
dissertation I make use of the qualitative method of knowledge production.  Given 
that the qualitative method is employed to answer the research question, in this section 
I aim to discuss specific variants of the qualitative method of data collection and 
analysis as the research paradigm that I view as being the ‘best fit’ to address the 
questions (and elicit the responses) that this dissertation seeks to answer.  In addition, 
in this section, I will provide a substantiation for my use of the qualitative paradigm 
in this dissertation.  
 
3.2.1. The qualitative method 
 
The qualitative method of research takes the view that there is an inextricable 
and recursive link between the researcher (the observer) and that which is 
researched (the observed). In other words, one of the fundamental underlying 
presuppositions of the qualitative paradigm is that knowledge production is a 
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function of the co-creation of meaning between the observer and the observed 
in a recursive, re-iterative system of feedback (Bateson, 1973).  
Seeing through this paradigmatic lens leads to several key epistemological and 
ontological implications about the nature of reality. Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
make the point that realities are mutable, they are not fixed and they are 
predicated on the creation of meaning through the interaction of the researcher 
and the research participant. The qualitative paradigm views reality as a 
construction between the observer and the observed, and seeks to produce 
knowledge in an inductive, case-by-case process that allows for meanings to be 
generated and interpreted within the social realm.  In the interpretivist position, 
Willis (2007) delineates this co-creation and production of a shared reality and 
constitutes the research framework and method of inquiry that this dissertation 
adopts. Thus, a key implication of framing research within the qualitative 
paradigm is that the emphasis is on an understanding of the worldview of the 
other. 
 
This places reflexivity at the centre of my research effort, in that my objective 
as researcher is to maximise my chances of understanding the worldview of 
those who work in the private security industry through a series of processes 
that include description, exploration and reiteration through asking questions; 
using two types of interviewing processes. Furthermore, “In the postmodern 
view, there is no “objective” reality independent of our subjective experiences” 
(Babbie, 2010: 28).  Given that this statement is a foundational tenet in relation 
to the generation of meaning in this research, its implications will be examined 
and discussed throughout this chapter. 
 
3.3. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMING OF THIS RESEARCH 
 
3.3.1. An overview of the concept of Nodal Governance 
 
 I have opted to choose nodal governance as described by Johnston and Shearing 
(2001; 2003) as the analytical framing in this dissertation. One of the main 
theoretical tenets underlying the analytic of nodal governance, postulates that a 
33 
 
nodal orientation towards governance is that of communication, collaboration 
and participation through a systemic interchange of tangible (objects or 
material) ‘things’ and intangible entities (such as information). Within this 
framework and in the context of this dissertation, nodal governance does not 
take the view that the governance of security and the provision of policing must 
necessarily be provided in a ‘top-down’ configuration by the state, nor that it is 
indeed the exclusive prerogative of the state.  Instead, the concept of ‘nodality’ 
views the state as one actor amongst many qua the provision of policing and the 
“governance of security” (Johnston and Shearing, 2003: 13).  
 
Johnston and Shearing (2003) assert that nodes have particular mentalities (that 
is, ways of thinking about what they do), they employ specific technologies and 
perform particular practices within various institutions in order to achieve their 
aims and objectives. For instance, and in relation to the private security industry 
as viewed through the conceptual lens of nodal governance and policing, the 
mentality may be similar or dissimilar to that of the public police.  The 
technologies that private security employs may include surveillance 
mechanisms such as closed-circuit television (CCTV), firearms, handcuffs, and 
conducted energy weapons, (commonly known as tasers) to fulfil their mandate 
of protecting their clients’ person and property.   
 
Whatever the properties that accrue to a specific node, the point is that a nodal 
system of government eschews the notion of a sovereign (the state) normatively 
being at the apex of the constellation that provides security. Thus, although the 
state may be at the apex of the provision of security (in certain countries and/or 
at certain temporal junctures), this is an empirical question, rather than a 
normative ‘given’.  What I wish to highlight here is that the provision of security 
may, in fact, be typified by a flat configuration of interconnecting systems that 
are comprised of many nodes as opposed to a hierarchically structured matrix 
with the state as apex actor. Again, this is an empirical question. 
 
In other words, theoretically and empirically speaking, nodes are not necessarily 
homogenous entities when compared to one another. For instance, and using the 
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concept of “security governance” (Johnston & Shearing, 2003: 13), some nodes 
are ‘strong and powerful’ whilst others are relatively ‘weak’. Their strength or 
weakness can be measured as a function of the resources that accrue to that 
specific node.  For example, economic or political power may accrue to certain 
nodes more than to other nodes.  However, the strength of a node is also 
dependent on the strength and number of its links to other nodes. In addition, 
Burris, Drahos and Shearing (2005) illustrate how weak nodes can ‘co-opt’ 
stronger nodes with the aim of creating power and legitimacy.  
 
An example of this in terms of the provision of policing, would be a suburban 
neighbourhood watch partnering with a suburban private security company, 
who in turn partners with a community policing forum that functions under the 
auspices of a local branch of the SAPS. A salient point here is that a 
“polycentric” (Berg, Ph.D. thesis, 2015) system of governance adheres to power 
and praxis as being spread horizontally across a nodal configuration so that it 
can deal more effectively with problems on a localised, as opposed to a 
centralised, level of security governance.  In other words, within this analytical 
framing, the police are important actors in the provision of safety, however, they 
are not the most important or most powerful actors.  Instead, they are one 
amongst many different sets of actors that collaborate and participate in that 
node in the provision of safety.  It is a ‘flat’, participatory style of governance. 
Put differently, policing, security and governance is no longer the sole 
prerogative of the state - there exist a myriad of non-state actors. To wit: “States 
are not the only nodes where power can be concentrated” (Wood & Shearing, 
2007: 102). 
 
In relation to my research, the companies that comprise the private security 
industry in South Africa are part of a nodal constellation in a networked 
configuration of stakeholders, all of whom have an interest in the provision of 
policing and the maintenance of order in South African society. One of the key 
reasons that I chose to opt for a nodal framing is that it is conducive to an 
analysis of the nature of the mentalities of the providers of private security 
without allowing a normative framework to affect my research findings.  Put 
differently, my adoption of a nodal framing facilitates the ‘seeing’ of the node 
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of private security unhindered by the strictures of a rule-bound set of 
expectations of what that node ‘should’, normatively speaking, look like.   
 
3.4. RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
As mentioned, this section will elucidate the systematic outline I developed for the study, 
and outlines the research ‘vehicle’ I used to systematically collect my data. In other 
words, I will outline the research design along with the reasons for having chosen the 
case study as being the best ‘fit’ to fulfil the objective of exploring the mentalities of the 
actors in the private security industry within the company that I have selected to study.   
 
3.5. THE CASE STUDY 
 
The attributes of the qualitative case study as a research design through which to gather 
data provided the best ‘fit’ in relation to the research question that I sought to answer. 
The reasons for this choice included an appraisal of the following objectives in this 
research: I chose the case study as my research aimed to focus in an in-depth manner on 
the mentalities of the actors in one private security company. It was thus a “single-case” 
design (Yin, 2009) in that one security company was the focus of the research, in addition 
to its being an embedded case which gave it its spatial and temporal delineation. In other 
words, an “embedded” case (Stake, 2000: 130) is delineated both in terms of the 
timeframe in which the research data is collected, in addition to the area or space that 
constitutes the research site. In terms of the spatial aspect of the case study, it was 
delineated with the unit of analysis being each personnel member whom I interviewed 
who worked at one private security company in the southern suburbs of Cape Town. In 
terms of the temporal delineation of this case study, the process of conducting the 
interviews spanned several months in 2017.   
Stake differentiates between three types of case study: “intrinsic, instrumental, [or] 
collective” (2000: 121-3). Given that my research objective in this dissertation is to 
explore the mentalities of private security providers to understand how they view their 
work in terms of the meanings they ascribe to what they do within their occupational 
remit, and in terms of Stake’s classification, my case study was an intrinsic one.  As Stake 
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explains: “I call a study an “intrinsic case study” if the study is undertaken because, first 
and last, one wants a better understanding of this particular case” (2000: 121, italics in 
original). 
In addition, Yin (1984) describes three categories of case study, namely: exploratory, 
descriptive and explanatory case studies. This case study sought to explore the ways the 
actors in a private security company thought about their work of providing security 
without framing it within a set of presuppositions.  Stake asserts that: “A case study is 
both a process of inquiry about the case and the product of that inquiry” (2000: 121). 
Thus, as the case takes shape through an analysis of the data, it starts to take shape 
regarding its spatial and temporal boundaries, befitting its primary unit of analysis - the 
individuals who work as providers of private security services. Simultaneously, through 
the process of data-gathering and analysis the case is the product of the observations of 
the mentalities of those who were observed by me. To wit: “The purpose of a case…is 
not to represent the world, but to represent the case” (Stake, 2000: 142). The case study 
allows for the data to unfold in such a way that the ‘type’ of case study is often only 
determined at the end of the research. In other words, the data shapes the case study, and 
not the other way around. 
Further, Lund (2014) makes the distinction between the following two questions which 
inform the design and analysis of the data gathered through the use of the case study. 
Both of these questions served to focus my attention on the objectives I had formulated 
through the choice of the case study as the research method in this work. They also 
highlighted the purpose of using this research method by keeping me mindful of the 
operational, methodological and conceptual clarity needed to carry out the research. 
Firstly, the question Lund (2014) asks is: “What is the case?” Secondly, he asks: “What 
is this a case of?” The answers to the former question is that it is a case of a private 
security company; and to the latter, that the case is one of an exploration of the mentalities 
of people who work in the private security industry. 
The qualitative case study was chosen as a better fit than, for instance, a survey or a series 
of focus groups, because of the nature of the research question and the depth of the 
responses that the questions invited.  A survey or a schedule of closed ended questions 
would not, I submit, have yielded the nuanced and “thick” (Geertz, 1973) data that I 
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received by allowing people to reflect on their answers and the thoughts and feelings that 
the questions engendered in terms of their responses.   
 
This method of gathering and interpreting the data furnished me with a deep and nuanced 
sense of the mentalities of those who work in the private security industry. Whilst 
quantitative data collection is often viewed as objective in that is deemed to be less likely 
to be contaminated by researcher bias and personal interpretations, the qualitative 
paradigm allows for maximum expression on the part of the participants and the 
maximum opportunity to obtain an in-depth view of the mentalities of workers in the 
private security field.  To this end, the participants were drawn from a cross-section of 
the personnel who operate at different tiers within the company so as to obtain as broad 
a data array as possible.  
 
 
3.6. RESEARCH METHODS 
 
Two types of qualitative interviews were used to collect the data for this dissertation: The 
standardised open-ended interview; and the informal conversational interview.  
 
3.6.1. The standardised open-ended interview 
 
I used this interview format to when interviewing the participants in this study.  
These interviews were between 45-90 minutes’ duration, and were audio-taped, 
transcribed and analysed thematically by me. They were conducted on the 
premises of the private security company, in a room that was shielded as far as 
possible from the general control/operations room to minimise the noise and 
distraction factors. As mentioned in chapter three, I selected a cross section of 
employees in the company with different job designations and different key 
areas of responsibility with the aim of obtaining as broad a range of responses 
as possible.  
The strength of this variant of qualitative interviewing is that all Respondents 
were asked the same questions in the same sequence so that all interviewees 
were given the opportunity to respond to the same questions as the rest of those 
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in the sample. The interview schedule (Appendix C) provided a framework to 
ensure that the questions asked by me were conducive to obtaining the 
maximum information pertaining to the research questions, whilst also allowing 
the participants the opportunity to elaborate and explore avenues not explicitly 
framed by the questions. The exploratory nature of the questions I posed allowed 
the participants to speak about their lived experience within the broad 
framework of the standardised open-ended interview, without a firm delineation 
of their experience in relation to specific aspects of their work.  This allowed for 
the themes to develop in an organic fashion and to approximate a conversation 
of many voices, with many thematic threads woven through it.   The research 
question is broad for this purpose - it does not seek to frame the participants’ 
views within a particular context in relation to the work that they do as providers 
of private security. In other words, the justification for this broad approach was 
that I aimed to desist from framing the participants’ answers to the semi-
structured questions in any pre-determined, specific way in relation to their 
mentalities as providers of private security.   
 
Probes were used for two reasons.  Firstly, to invite the interviewees to expand 
upon their answers or to explore their responses further.  Secondly, they were 
used in a recursive pattern of feedback between the interviewer and the 
interviewee. This feedback loop facilitated a clarification of the Respondents’ 
answers to be checked for meaning. This was key for controlling for any bias on 
my part as the interviewer to ensure that I was recording their meanings 
unfiltered through my worldview.  In other words, I wanted to ensure that it was 
their mentalities that I was getting a picture of as opposed to framing their 
meanings within any preconceived notions of mine.  
 
3.6.2. The informal conversational interview 
 
This type of interview is generally loosely structured and takes place in spaces 
and at times where the atmosphere is not spatially or temporally structured for 
the gathering of data in an organized, sequential fashion.   
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I made use of this type of interviewing when I accompanied an armed response 
guard in the course of his daily duties for the day. This ‘ride-along’ allowed me 
the opportunity to gather information from him and from other employees we 
visited at various sites mandated by this company’s customers to secure.  
 
However, whilst this interviewing format is loosely structured around a 
conversation, I kept the questions focused on topics that relate to the research 
question. The strength of this conversational style of data-gathering is that the 
guard with whom I rode along for the day, in addition to the other guards to 
whom I spoke at the various sites, were mostly forthcoming and open to 
responding to my questions.  This was perhaps attributable to the space in which 
these conversations were conducted, that is, outside of the bounds of the 
company’s office environment. 
 
Notwithstanding, I anticipated a weakness around this form of gathering data, 
in that I may have ended up with information that does not shed much light or 
provide much quality data on my research question. However, this was 
mitigated through my stance as the interviewer in that I endeavoured to remain 
open and non-directive whilst simultaneously being able to gather pithy 
information through astute observation and a conversational style. 
 
3.7. DATA ANALYSIS 
 
A contextualised thematic analysis was conducted on the raw data that I transcribed from 
the interviews. This thematic analysis was broadly based on Braun and Clarke’s (2014: 
1947-1952) six stage method that takes one through the process of turning raw qualitative 
data into research findings though the identification, analysis and finally the writing up 
of themes from the transcribed interviews.  
 
The operationalisation of these six phases included transcribing the interviews followed 
by reading the transcribed material several times to obtain a sense of overall themes that 
comprised the data array. A reading and re-reading of the Respondents’ narratives and 
descriptions were grouped into broad themes. These themes were then coded and re-read 
40 
 
to check for accurate categorisation and for sub-themes. This whole process was re-
iterative and recursive. During the interview process, I checked in with the Respondents 
using probes, both to mine further data, and to ensure that what I was hearing was indeed 
aligned with what the Respondents were sharing with me. These probes were often 
responded to with a level of thoughtfulness that allowed this symbolic or figurative level 
of the Respondents’ mentalities to be thought about and elaborated upon. This in turn 
lead back to further empirical data being offered by the Respondents, and so on in a 
recursive, re-iterative process of meaning-making, much like the process of the 
development of different aspects of a ‘pre-digital age’ photograph. 
 
The final phase comprised taking the data array, thematically arranged into research 
findings and wrote them up, using the Respondents’ own words as far as possible, and 
obviating duplication of data; whilst being mindful of the interrelatedness of certain 




3.8. LIMITATIONS AND CHALLENGES  
 
3.8.1. Whose lived experience is being explored? 
I endeavoured to be mindful and self-reflexive when gathering data to obviate, 
as far as possible, the pitfalls inherent in the intersubjectivity between the 
researcher and the researched within the qualitative paradigm. In other words, 
and as mentioned earlier in the Chapter, my objective was to ensure that the data 
reflected the mentalities of those whom I was interviewing, as opposed to having 
the stamp of my worldview on it.  This meant that I worked in such way as to 
steer clear of framing the Respondents’ answers within the context of my lived 
experience, as opposed to through theirs. This required vigilance and the ability 
to step into the other’s shoes. As mentioned, a nodal framing facilitated this 
ability to ‘see’ the other, free from any normative meta-narrative being placed 
upon the observations.  
I operationalised this checking for the meaning inherent in the interviewees’ 
answers (as opposed to the imposition of my meanings on their responses) by 
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bearing in mind my two-fold role:  Within this conceptual paradigm of enquiry 
wherein reality is viewed as being intersubjective (Willis, 2007) and thus co-
created, the researcher will be both inside and outside the boundaries of the case: 
‘Inside’ the case in the sense of the co-creation of reality through the very act of 
interrelatedness, and simultaneously on the outside as the researcher.    
 
3.8.2. Race and gender differences - a barrier to obtaining quality data? 
My concern was that my being a white woman interviewing predominately 
black and coloured males in a male-dominated industry may curtail the quantity 
and quality of information that the Respondents’ chose to share with me. This 
challenge was particularly pertinent given that the research was carried out in 
South Africa, where the discourse of race holds a central position in the 
construction of this country’s social, political, economic and historical narrative. 
As Diphoorn asserts in “The Bravo Mike Syndrome”, “…race is a social 
construction that is generated, moulded, and reified through social practices.” 
(2015: 4).  The question for me was whether the research participants would 
allow me to gain authentic and deep insight into the mentalities that informed 
their daily practices in the field of private security, given the differences in our 
respective demographics.    
However, when I examined the data array upon completion of the data collection 
phase of this study, I was gratified by the range and depth of the responses that 
the interviewees chose to share with me.  I believe that the Interview Schedule 
and the use of well-placed probes, coupled with my being attuned and genuinely 
interested in the process and content of the interviews and what was shared with 
me, mitigated this issue.  
 
3.8.3. Whither generalisability? 
Another key limitation of this research is that its generalisability is 
circumscribed, given that it is a single case study of a single private security 
company. In addition, the number of people interviewed (albeit that the 
interviews yielded in-depth data) may be construed as a limitation. However, 
given the proliferation of similar security companies in the southern suburbs of 
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Cape Town (Berg, 2010). In research undertaken in the field of private security 
in the South African metropoles of Cape Town, Johannesburg, Pretoria 
(Tshwane) and Durban Minnaar (2002) demonstrates the similitude of the ways 
things are done across the spectrum of South African cities in the field of private 
security. Given this, I believe that the issue of non-generalisability and the 
concomitant lack of research reliability is partially ameliorated.  
In addition, my research aim was not limited to making an empirical finding. It 
was also undertaken with the objective of contributing to the existing body of 
literature on the mentalities of those who work in the private security industry.  
 
3.9. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
 
Interviews are interventions. They affect people. A good interview lays 
open thoughts, feelings, knowledge, and experience, not only to the 
interviewer, but also to the interviewee. The process of being taken through 
a directed, reflective process affects the persons being interviewed and 
leaves them knowing things that they didn’t know - or at least were not fully 
aware of - before the interview (Quinn Patton, 2002: 405). 
Given this, steps were taken to ensure the figurative safety of the interview space in the 
following ways:  
The Informed Consent Forms for both the standardised open-ended questionnaire and the 
informal conversational interview (see Appendix C and D respectively) emphasise the 
fact that the interviewees’ identities would not be disclosed and that the information they 
shared would be kept in strict confidence.  In addition, I stressed that all interviewees 
were at liberty to terminate the interviews at any point if they wished to do so.  
Fortunately, from the standpoint of gathering as much data as possible, none of them 
exercised this option. However, some interviewees did share information with me that 
they requested be kept “off-the record” to protect themselves from any reprisals that they 
feared may flow from some of the information shared.  
Given that private security personnel operate within a system (both under state and non-
state auspices) that deals with the governance of security and the minimising of risk and 
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harms to those to whom they are contracted to serve, the issue of illegal incidents and 
dealings alluded to (and indeed canvassed) by some of the interviewees came up.  
However, the research objective, in terms of the framing of the questions of both types 
of interviews largely meant that the data fell outside of the ambit of the legal sphere. 
However, where the information shared may have had legal consequences should it be 
exposed in the public domain, I made the commitment to the interviewees that this 
information would not be used in this research. I maintained confidentiality on both an 




My objective in this chapter has been to furnish an outline of the research paradigm that 
I have employed in this study, along with methods and the means of analysis employed 
to answer the research question.  In addition, I have sought to highlight both the strengths 
and the limitations that accrue to this study; with a focus on capitalising on the strengths 
of this design along with an effort to ameliorate its limitations. This chapter has also 
addressed the ethical considerations and implications that accrue to this type of research, 
to control as far as possible for any adverse consequences for the Respondents in this 
study.   
 
 
In the following chapter, I will present my research findings flowing from the data array 







4. RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
My objective in this chapter is two-fold. Firstly, I will present the research findings, grouped 
thematically, secondly, I will provide commentary on the findings as delineated under each of 
these themes, to illustrate how each of these themes speaks to elements that comprise an overall 
picture of the mentalities of those who work in the field of private security. The themes 
foregrounded in this chapter will offer readers an opportunity to obtain a sense of what it is like 
to ‘do’ private security in a middle-class socio-economic milieu in the southern suburbs of 
Cape Town in 2017. This chapter additionally illustrates areas of confluence and/or divergence 
between the existing literature and my research findings.   
 
Whilst the themes are presented under separate headings, the Aristotelian axiom of ‘the whole 
being greater than the sum of its parts’ has bearing here, as each of the themes presented 
contains more points of confluence as opposed to trajectories of divergence. In other words, 
seemingly discrete narratives can be viewed as parts of a greater conversation with similar 
points of reference regarding the mentalities of the people whom I interviewed. In addition, I 
found that the Respondents’ mentalities spoke their lived experiences in ways that traverse and 
intersect several disciplinary fields - the predominant ones being related to security governance, 
social psychology and economics. This was salient in that it mirrored the complexity of the 
Respondents’ daily lived experience in the private security industry as being multi-faceted and 
nuanced. In this way, the research findings, when transcribed and analysed, provided what 
Geertz (1973) termed ‘thick description’. 
 
As mentioned in the Introduction to this dissertation, a mentality is defined as a way of thinking 
about something, a ‘philosophical’ stance towards people, places and things that manifests as 
and translates into the daily praxis of providing private security. As described in Chapters Two 
and Three, the analytical framework within which the data is positioned is that of a nodal 
paradigm of security governance as articulated by, amongst others, Johnston and Shearing, 
2003. Within this analytic, all programmes of security (that is, nodes) that have a stake in the 
provision of security have four basic attributes, namely: “mentalities, institutions, technologies 
and practices” (Johnston & Shearing, Ibid., 13, italics in original).  
 
The data that I present and discuss in this Chapter will serve to demonstrate how the node of 
private security is informed by particular ways of cognition and praxis in relation to the 
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mentalities that accrue to the actors in the field of private security.  I also demonstrate how the 
ways that the actors think about what they do, informs their doing of the work, and vice versa. 
This recursion between thinking about and doing the work of private security informs both the 
intra-organisational mentalities and the attitudinal position adopted by these actors in relation 
to other institutions.  
 
A marked sense of ambivalence and ambiguity in the narratives and descriptions that recurred 
throughout the interviews illustrated the complexity of the mentalities of those whom I 
interviewed. Their responses sometimes appeared contradictory. However, when the research 
findings are viewed in totality and in the context of the lived experience of these workers, 
narratives that at first appeared to be contradictory start to emerge with a marked sense of 
clarity. To use Diphoorn’s words, the work of private security engenders mentalities that in 
many respects are “neither one nor the other, but something combined and in between, 
something “twilight” (2013: 277).  It is this ambivalent, ambiguous character of many of the 
narratives presented here that I aim to highlight, examine and discuss.   
 
In addition, the Respondents’ narratives spoke to two levels of experience.  Firstly, their 
responses fleshed out their reality of the daily work of providing private security on a literal 
level. The second level, the level of the symbolic and the figurative, was accessed using probes 
as an invitation to the Respondents to express their meanings on a deeper level.   
 
In this way, the process of narration, description and meaning-making all contributed to the 
formation of a ‘picture’ of the mentalities of these Respondents in relation to their work.  
 
4.1. PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN THE PUBLIC POLICE AND PRIVATE 
SECURITY 
 
This theme highlighted the nature of the partnerships between private security and the 
public police and how the Respondents characterised this relationship. The narratives and 
anecdotes that described how private security view their relationship with   the public 
police placed the police simultaneously in a ‘better than, and worse than’ position in 
relation to themselves. In terms of how the police were ‘better than’ them, what was 
highlighted in the narratives was that ‘better than’ could to taken to mean several things. 
However, the meaning that the Respondents described most often throughout their 
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narratives was that the public police were construed as being ‘better off than’ the 
providers of private security in the material sense. However, the sense of material safety 
that these Respondents attributed to the public police led to several key symbolic 
implications as foregrounded by their further responses. When probed on the ways in 
which they perceived the public police to be ‘better off’ than the providers of private 
security, these narratives are richly telling in their candour:  
 
Respondent 5 recounts the following:  
 
So me I have seen many murders, you know, around here there is many 
gangsters ’cos I live in [names a suburb close to another that is known for 
high levels of social dysfunction manifesting in drug abuse, crime and 
gangsterism in the context of overwhelming poverty] so all the gangsters 
they come here to where I live. Then there is also people that drink and 
smoke [methamphetamine, known locally as ‘tik’] so that they fight and 
end up dead. We sometimes don’t want to help because like I say it can 
cause problems for us by the police. (Interview 5, armed response officer, 
February 2017). 
 
Respondent 3, echoing similar sentiments, remarked that: 
 
When we see a murder - we just call the police - ’cos then they [the SAPS] 
ask us why has the person died and they were alive just now? Only if the 
people are fighting then you can try and stop that fight, but if there is 
someone and you can see he is dead or bleeding and not moving then you 
[private security] better not do anything. Rather call the police otherwise 
you can make problems for yourself and for the company because they [the 
SAPS] think maybe you had something to do with it [the death].  So, you 
just call the ambulance and the police must take it from there. (Interview 3, 
armed response officer, February 2017).  
 
What is striking here is how the narratives and the mentalities around the public 
police/private security interface are characterised by a sense of uncertainty and insecurity 
in two ways. Firstly, and in line with the work of Minnaar (2005) and Rigakos (2002) the 
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very organisation that is mandated by the state to govern security and maintain public 
order - the public police, are viewed by these Respondents as oppositional, indeed, often 
as hostile to the point where, according to this Respondent, it was very possible that the 
public police would implicate private security guards in an individual’s death.  Secondly, 
the following vignette illustrates ambivalence in the face of feeling under resourced in 
relation to the SAPS. The context was a discussion around his carrying a firearm: 
 
…it’s not a good thing. The guys from [names a suburb notorious for high 
levels of  gangster-related violence and deaths] they want a firearm.  They 
call it a ‘waapie’  [weapon]. Some days when my boss forgets to sign for 
my firearm - he must sign for it to say I’m having it, then if he forgets to 
sign for the firearm, I feel free because then I can know that I don’t have to 
be a target for those guys that want to kill securities [security guards] for 
their firearms. So, then I feel free at those times. (Interview 3, armed 
response officer, February 2017). 
 
After sharing about the danger of being killed for one’s firearm, he expresses the 
following in an ostensible contradiction to his above narrative: 
 
But I am ok. They [would-be criminals] see me with a firearm and they’re 
scared of  me. (Interview 3, armed response officer and supervisor, 
February 2017).  
 
This vignette about the firearm foregrounds the ambivalent attitude he has towards 
carrying a firearm: One the one hand, he feels safe when he has it, as it can be used to 
ward off would-be criminals.  
 
The theme of being (more) under-resourced and (more) over-burdened than the public 
police. In the words of an armed response officer: 
 
…when there is an alarm I get scared… the criminals will target me and if 
they take my firearm, then I will lose the firearm license…Many, many 
security guys get killed for their firearm…If you don’t run but try to fight 
48 
 
them, then you can easily be killed, and for what? (Interview 3, armed 
response officer and supervisor, February 2017).  
 
In sum, the relationship between the public police and private security from these 
Respondents’ perspectives, ranges from difficult to downright dysfunctional, and is 
circumscribed by ambivalence and uncertainty. These findings are similar to the 
findings of Rigakos (2002), in that the partnership is circumscribed by uncertainty.    
 
The following sub-theme will examine and discuss communication by focussing on 
two types of partnerships: Firstly, between private security and the public police and 




The sub-theme of communication as part of characterisation and description of 
the relationship between themselves and the SAPS, is illustrated in this 
anecdote: 
 
I had an incident recently where a car was broken into…it was about 17H25. 
So, when I phoned SAPS to hand the incident over to them, the lady that 
answered said, “How can you phone me now with this? We are busy 
handing over now” [to the next shift]. (Interview 4, control room operator, 
February 2017). 
 
This Respondent works as a dispatcher in the control room monitoring incoming 
and making outgoing calls to the company’s guards. In addition, she monitors 
the surveillance cameras that give her multiple views of the company’s sites - 
both the private sites and within the boundaries of the local Improvement 
District that this company is mandated to keep, in the words of Respondent 6: 
“safe, secure and clean.” (Interview 6, February 2017). 
 
The lack of clear and comprehensive communication between members of the 
public police and the providers of private security described here highlights 
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more than the paucity of quality communication. It speaks to the quality of the 
relationship between two organisations whose mandate is to provide security 
and the way in which this relationship is experienced by these private security 
actors. Respondent 1 succinctly sums up the public police/private security 
partnership and the mentalities that private security have formed around this 
often-uneasy partnership: 
 
I must say that the cooperation we get from SAPS is not good. I am not only 
speaking  about a specific police station in this area, but other private 
security companies also find that…it’s the same problem they face.  
(Interview 1, Owner, February 2017). 
 
The challenges around effective and clear communication extended to the public 
and not just in relation to the SAPS.  For instance, when I asked one of the 
control room operators whether there were any parts of her job that she disliked, 
she replied:  
 
Communication…lack of communication. Like if a member of the public 
calls and says, “I need an ambulance service” but they don’t give me the 
details of where the ambulance needs to go and they just start yelling at me 
that this is your job, just do your job!’ How can I do my job properly if I 
don’t have all the information I need? What frustrates me is when people 
call in and they start to shout - they don’t understand how it works.”  
Perhaps tellingly, this Respondent added that she felt a member of the 
public would never speak to a member of the public police as “rudely” as 
she was often spoken to. (Interview 4, control room operator, February 
2017). 
 
This Respondent’s anecdote is indicative of both a relationship where private 
security is the ‘victim’ - disdained by the public and the public police alike. 
There is a great deal of literature that highlights the private security industry as 
being vilified and disdained. (See, for instance, Berg, 2004; Diphoorn, 2016; 
and White, 2010). As can be gathered from the above narratives, my findings 
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bear marked convergences with the literature regarding the challenges inherent 
in the relationship between the public police and private security.  
 
4.1.2. The inefficiency of the SAPS 
 
This issue was brought up by all ten Respondents I interviewed, and by those I 
spoke to informally.   
 
The police, if you call them for assistance, they will come maybe seven to 
eight hours after; and they will say they didn’t have a van available or some 
other story, but you cannot rely on the police because they don’t care.  They 
just leave you so you don’t get any support from them…so we at [company 





I would work for the police because the job is easy and they are not serious. 
When you go to the station, the people [members of the public] are waiting 
there, and the police can take one or two hours to help you with a small 
thing.  When I was a foot patroller - I liked to take a suspect to the police 
station at say 4.30 or 5.00 pm.  My boss would ask me: “why are you taking 
so long?” But when the police do shift change at that time of night they can 
take one hour, two hours, three hours, even more.  So I can take the suspect 
there and sit there nicely in the warm offices and my boss can’t say anything 
because if he asks why I am taking so long I can say oh well, I was with the 
suspect at the police station [laughs]. (Interview 3, armed response officer, 
February 2017). 
 
This was an interesting sub-theme as it was juxtaposed with an intriguing 
paradox in the sense-making of how private security view themselves both intra- 
and interpersonally. They view themselves simultaneously as better than the 
police, as they are driven by competitive market forces to service their clients 
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efficiently and effectively; whereas the public police are not driven by the 
market at all, according to these Respondents because they “don’t have clients 
like we do” (Interview 6, control room operator, March 2017). However, their 
narratives also repeatedly highlighted the ways in which they construed 
themselves as being worse-off than the public police. 
 
What emerged in relation to the theme of private security’s relationship with the 
police (and indeed with members of the public at times) was that, despite their 
predominantly negative view of the police, the desire to ‘be’ the police and all 
that that entails on both a symbolic and a literal level was a recurrent sentiment 
woven throughout their narratives. 
 
When making sense of this, this Respondent’s rationale for the lack of 
cooperation and coordination between the SAPS and private security companies 
is described in these words: 
 
…in my time [as a member of SAPS] private security were seen as more of 
a hindrance than as a helping hand, For want of a better word, we used to 
look down on private security. (Interview 1, owner of company, February 
2017).    
 
When I probed as to how they made sense of this ‘disconnect’ regarding 
communication, co-operation and coordination with the SAPS, the prevailing 
sense was the providers of private security that had internalised this to mean that 
they are ‘not as good as’ the police; even in light of their overriding view of the 
public police as being inefficient and incompetent. 
 
Here again there is a convergence between the literature and my findings 
regarding how private security frame themselves in relation to the SAPS. (See, 
for instance, Manzo, 2010). 
 




A branch of the literature looks at the “legitimating practices” that private security 
staff engage in, illustrating their need to justify and to defend their position in the 
arena of the governance of security. This research also looks at the coping mechanisms 
they employ within the ambit of their work. See, for instance, du Toit (2015), Loader 
and White (2015) and Loader, Goold and Thumala, (2014).  One of the dominant 
themes that underpins these studies finds that: “the occupational culture of security 
officers enhances self-esteem by infusing security work with a sense of purpose.” 
Furthermore, that the providers of private security: “… Employ a range of strategies 
to deflect scorn and reframe their work as important and necessary” (Löfstrand, Loftus 
& Loader, 2015: 1).  
 
“We do what the police do, but we’re not them. We’re somewhere 
halfway” (Diphoorn, 2013: 277).  
 
The sense of “being halfway”, as described by an armed response officer was a 
sentiment that was echoed throughout the narratives told by the security personnel I 
interviewed. There was the abiding feeling of having to ‘stake one’s claim’ both 
internally and in terms of warding off competitors (and thus hold onto market share) 
whilst simultaneously bolstering one’s sense of purpose and of being important and 
useful assets in the broader landscape of the governance of security.  
 
Put differently and using Bourdieu’s (1992) terms, the objective of these actors, 
based on their narratives and anecdotes, is to shift out of a space of (literal and 
figurative) insecurity through the acquisition and retention of both “symbolic capital” 
and “social capital” in one’s own eyes, and in the eyes of others.  
 
Respondent 4 illustrated this point thus:  
 
People think that if you work in this industry you are not educated. They 
say things like “I pay your tax.” No, I work and I pay tax just like they do…. 
I put myself through college and I am educated…when I first experienced 
that, I mean the way some people talk to you when you are in this 
industry…I felt bad, like I was ashamed or something like that. But like I 
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say that was way back. Now I’m used to it. (Interview 4, control room 
operator, February 2017).  
 
This interviewee was one of the few who had undergone training in another field prior 
to entering the field of private security.  Many of the others whom I interviewed had 
either entered the field after completing their schooling (up to whatever level they had 
attained) or had entered the industry, “because it is easy to find jobs here.” (Interview 
10, guard, March 2017). 
 
This theme of praxis, agency and legitimacy existed on both an intra-personal and on 
an inter-personal level regarding the sense of being on ‘shifting occupational ground’, 
as it were.   Insecurity and the sense of not knowing where one stands in the broader 
scope of the governance of security is repeatedly highlighted through the responses to 
the both the formal interviews and in the conversational milieus. This manifested in 
the Respondents’ narratives as an injunction, either addressed openly or alluded to, of 
the need to ‘fight’ to hold on to a sense of self in the face of the disdain of the public 
and in relation to the public police. 
 
In the face of this, the company’s owner was instrumental in assisting his staff to 
strengthening their sense of who they are in relation to their work as evidenced in the 
following vignette: 
 
…it immediately puts the security officer on the back foot and makes them 
insecure…if the security guard can’t speak your [the client’s] language then 
they often immediately feel uncertain and see themselves as inferior to you 
[the client] ...I’m there most of the time and I see what happens. These 
people don’t greet the guy, [the guard] and I’ve seen it, not once, not twice, 
but a hundred times…. And I say listen, just because it’s a white woman in 
a fancy car that doesn’t mean she doesn’t need to respect you.  (Interview 
1, security company owner, February 2017). 
 
In addition to the need to fight for one’s legitimacy and agency as a provider of private 
security, on an internal level, there is also the external economic driver, namely the 




We sometimes don’t want to co-operate with other security companies, 
because, say the suspect moves on into a suburb controlled by another 
[private security] company then they [the other private security firm] make 
it look like it is their arrest and that they did the work when it was us that 
did all the work, really. (Interview 6, control room operator, February 
2017).   
 
Respondent 3’s words add to this sense of the desire to maintain the company’s 
competitive edge: 
 
We must do [names the suburb] Improvement District and all the other sites 
that we have, but I must supervise all of that.  The Improvement District is 
a good one because I am one of the guys that knows the area the best 
because I started here seven years ago, so I know the area very well.  I like 
this area so when people see [this area] they must see us, not the police.  
They don’t see the police, they see us. …Because the police…there can be 
a crime committed, say we arrest a guy for housebreaking but the police can 
take maybe longer than two hours to get there and then by that time we 
cannot stay with the guy for all that time, so we have another guy to wait 
with him so that he can check that the guy does not get out of his handcuffs 
before the police come. But it is good that the police take so long because 
then all the clients know that the police here in this area are useless and that 
it is no use to even call them because they take so long, so they call us first. 
(Interview 3, armed response officer, February 2017).  
 
In fact, several interviewees asserted that the local police precinct’s ‘uselessness’ was 
good for business in the sense that it ensured that their contracts - in this case the 
Improvement District contract - would be extended and renewed, given that their 
standards of service were, in their view, far superior to that of the police.   
 
The flip-side of this feeling of doing a superior job in comparison to the public police, 
highlights the narrative of feeling disrespected and undervalued by the public, in the 




If they [potential offenders] are at one of our sites then they are on private 
property - that is our client’s place, so we have to tell the troublemakers 
or the vagrants to move away from that place. The problem is that my job 
is too hard because most of the time those people are high and you are 
normal, so they swear at you and talk bad to you but you just must keep 
calm and quiet and not make the whole problem worse. But ja, [yes], it is 
hard to get sworn at by these people sometimes. They don’t respect you. 
(Interview 5, armed response officer, February 2017). 
 
Weaving another strand into this theme, one of the guards who was stationed at a 
residential complex to which this company is contracted and with whom I spoke on 
one of our stops during the ride-along, provided his own vivid description of the sense 
of the (ill)legitimacy of the private police and conveyed the sense of powerlessness 
and impotence he felt through the following summation: 
 
Well, the problem is that we are like barking dogs…we can bark but we 
can’t bite. (Informal conversational interview, patrolling guard, 23 March 
2017). 
 
He then went on to say that whilst the police are legitimate, that is, they can ‘bite’ as 
they hold the state-sanctioned mandate to govern security through the use of coercive 
force (Bittner,1970) to impose some type of sanction on someone who has broken the 
law, they often will not do so: 
 
The police arrive…like four hours after we have called them [to an incident] 
and everything has calmed down by then.  They write up a short report and 
then they go around the corner, they throw it [the report] in the dustbin. 
(Informal conversational interview, guard, 23 March 2017). 
 
This sense of the discretionary meting out of sanctions on the part of the public police 
is further described:  Armed Response, upon detaining an alleged offender for stealing 
at a factory informed the SAPS, who arrived at the scene, but decided not to prosecute 
the alleged thief.  The reason they gave for deciding not to prosecute had something 
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to do with a law under which a suspect caught in possession of stolen goods could not 
be prosecuted if the value of the goods totalled R100 or less (which was apparently 
the case here). Although this Respondent felt that the goods’ value was clearly more 
than R100, she desisted from raising her objections to the police, and accordingly 
deferred to their judgment. When I probed further, her response was: 
 
Well, it’s the police who are telling me this, and they must be right - even 
though I know they are wrong. (Interview 6, control room operator, 
February 2017).  
 
What emerges from these interviews are various themes around practices of a 
perceived discretionary meting out of justice and application of the law on the part of 
the police.     
The feelings of uncertainty and a lack of feeling secure is manifested throughout these 
interviews on two levels. Firstly, what emerged throughout the Respondents’ 
narratives was a tentativeness about the scope of the work, particularly when 
juxtaposed against the occupational ambit and state-sanctioned occupational reach of 
the public police. Secondly, a recurrent theme emerged of the relative dearth of 
resources (both literally and figuratively) to fulfil that remit. 
 
As Respondent 9 observed:  
We get taught about the law, but it’s not easy to know when to make an 
arrest or not, and when we should leave it to the police. (Interview 9, guard, 
March 2017).  
 
In sum, the Respondents viewed the public police as being the final arbiters of whom 
to prosecute and under what conditions they will undertake to do so. Whilst this is the 
case in terms of the law, it underscores the idea of the public police as being the only 
‘legitimate’ arbiters of the law and of having the authority to decide whether to 
prosecute and open a case against a suspect or not. Private security guards are an 
afterthought, which is an irony given that it is they who usually hand over a suspect to 
the police after the harm (either to person and/or to property) has been committed, as 
57 
 
they are the ones who, more often than not, are called to a crime scene at the outset (see, 
for instance, Cooper-Knock, 2016) on this last point in relation to the reactive nature of 
the SAPS in contrast to the proactivity of private security as viewed from the 
perspective of the consumers of private security in KwaZulu-Natal). 
 
However, add to this the fact that English is not the first or second language of the 
Respondents, a certain occupational landscape begins to take shape: one that is fraught 
with a sense of uncertainty with respect to the law, a sense of being ‘less than’ in relation 
to the SAPS, a shaky edifice in relation to the training that they have received in order to 
do this work and the ever-present threat of danger.  These responses all speak directly to 
the issue of being in a precarious position as a provider of private security, in that the 
occupational remit is maximise order and to minimise harms, but the foundation upon 
which this work is carried out is circumscribed by insecurity and uncertainty.  
 
 
Respondent 6 recounted a situation where a suspect was arrested upon suspicion of theft, 
and the police decided that they would not open a case.  The decision not to do so was 
unclear to this private security staff member involved in this situation. However, what 
was made clear was that some form of deterrent was intended to be used against the 
suspect, presumably to circumscribe the chances of his committing further infractions. 
This was to be done through negative reinforcement - the use of pain. The deterrent was 
summed up in a request, allegedly asked by a policeman: 
 
Can’t you just take him around the corner and give him a hiding? My 
response officer said No. At the end of the day the criminals have mos [of 
course] got rights. They can make a case against us and say the security did 
beat me up…SAPS is just plain lazy to do their jobs. And we don’t assault 
people and the criminals have more rights than others these days. (Interview 
6, control room operator, February 2017).  
 
Again, the themes of a sense of powerlessness and a lack of legitimacy arise - in the 
governance of safety and security hierarchy, private security providers appear to be 
subordinate to the police in several ways.  These narratives provided myriad examples of 
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the public police having the authority and the ability, ratified by their privileged position 
as arbiters of justice appointed under state auspices.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, in South Africa, the SAPS legitimacy is directly 
proportional to their ability to fight crime successfully. However, my findings diverge 
from the literature as espoused by, for example, Bradford et al., (2014), Minnaar (2010) 
and Shaw (2002) whose research illustrates that, in South Africa, the test of police 
legitimacy is not ability to manifest justice or parity that counts, it is their effectiveness 
as crime fighters.    
 
 
In contrast to this, my research findings point to the Respondents as viewing the public 
police as legitimate for a different reason. They are indeed seen as legitimate, but not 
because their effectiveness in fighting crime. They are legitimate because they work for 
the state, regardless of their degree of (in)competence. Private security in South Africa, 
although they see themselves as more efficient and effective than the public police, are 
not as legitimate as the public police because they lack, according to these Respondents 
that “sought-after element of statehood” (White: 2010: 183). In sum, the SAPS are 
‘legitimate’, regardless of their ‘uselessness’: 
 
. …these days to them [the SAPS] it’s just a job, it’s not a calling. There’s 
no passion for the work anymore these days. Like I say the police are 80% 
bad. There are only a few good ones. There will be two or three guys that 
are good, but they are  usually the old guys. I don’t call it a police 
service…it’s a police circus. (Interview 2, operations manager, February 
2017). 
 
In summary and in relation to this theme around agency, praxis and legitimacy, the 
Respondents’ narratives illustrated their feelings of insecurity and uncertainty in relation 
to their scope of practice and how each interaction (both in relation to the public police 
and to the public in general) would play out. Diphoorn (2016) turns the notion of the 
binary between the victim and the persecutor (or perpetrator) on its head, as it 
problematises the notions of power, control, and punishment as being the prerogative of 
the ones who order the sequencing of events in the social realm. Diphoorn describes how 
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the armed guard whom she observed became the victim as opposed to the persecutor in 
a particular scenario.  Not only is he subjected to the abusive treatment detailed above by 
a member of the citizenry, he is also upbraided for not being successful in his 
apprehension of the perpetrator and is further vilified for his ‘incompetence’. 
 
4.3. PRAGMATISM AND THE EMERGENCE OF A PARADOX  
 
One of the strongest themes that arose recurrently, was that of the primary motivating 
factors that led to these individuals entering the field of private security in the first place.  
The driving force appeared to come down to pragmatic exigencies. For example, many 
of the Respondents spoke about the difficulty of getting quality medical care and 
education for their families. In addition, and on a more basic level, many spoke of being 
grateful to receive a salary on time at the end of each month worked (Interview 9, guard, 
March 2017) and were grateful not only that they were paid timeously, but also that they 
were paid in full. (Interview 8, guard, March 2017). Some spoke of ex-employers in the 
industry who would not pay them in full for some infraction - real or imagined - on the 
part of the employee, (Interview 4, control room operator, February 2017), 
 
Still others spoke of how the market was being undercut because of the lack of regulation 
of foreigners who were prepared to work in the private security field for lower wages 
than South African citizens were, and the deleterious effects of this wage undercutting.  
 
It’s bad money because they [foreigners] will work for less and for longer 
hours. (Interview 10, guard, March 2017). 
 
In sum, the sentiment that ran through these narratives was one of the physical struggle 
for survival: 
 
South Africa is a tough place and the crime is bad. But I need to be able to 
feed my family, so even though the job is hard and can be dangerous and 
the hours are long, I can’t be without a job. (Interview 5, armed response 






The salary is ok - they [the company] provide a provident fund, UIF 
(Unemployment Insurance Fund); and funeral expenses are covered; but it’s 
hard because we don’t get medical aid. Medical expenses are too expensive. 
We will have to go to the cheapest doctor and to the hospital, but the [state] 
hospital where I stay is not good.  I live in [a suburb that falls outside the 
demarcated area of a “white” (read, “good”) hospital. So, I will cheat and I 
give a different [false] address so that I can use a good hospital, because the 
hospital where I live is bad.  I don’t want to go there because the gangsters, 
when they shoot each other or say the one guy is stabbed and has to go to 
hospital, then the gangsters will just come into the hospital and shoot him 
dead.  It happens there a lot so I don’t want to go to that hospital.  That is 
why I cheat ’cos I don’t want to take a chance. (Interview 3, armed response 
guard, February 2017). 
 
This Respondent would rather provide a false residential address and run the risk of 
misrepresenting himself (and deal with whatever consequences may flow from that) than 
risk his life, and that of his family by going for medical treatment to the ‘bad’ hospital. 
 
The public police are ‘better-off’ than private security workers 
 
The police, as government employees, enjoy benefits and perks that the providers 
of private security do not.  This was summed up succinctly: 
 
The advantage of working for the government is that there is a lot of things 
like the medical aid, the bond, the car insurance…stuff like that.  The way 
they work and the perks, if private security could have these things, if they 
could include these things, it could be ok to us [to work in the private 
security industry], you see? (Interview 5, armed response guard, February 
2017). 
 
Various answers abound as to why these individuals viewed the public police as 
an attractive employer, and they are all succinctly summed up in Respondents 5’s 




Because it’s a job. Because I need to be able to feed my family. Because 
my kids need to have uniforms to go to school, otherwise they will be told 
to leave the school if they don’t have the right uniform. (Interview 5, armed 
response guard, February 2017). 
 
It appears that, in the South African context, the practical exigencies are 
paramount throughout these responses. Remuneration and job security are seen 
as being ‘thin’ in the private security industry in relation to the SAPS. However, 
what this Respondent’s narrative also highlights is that practical considerations, 
like having a job, appear to be one of the primary motivating factors driving these 
individuals to enter the field of private security, and to stay in this field. 
 
Thus, one of the strongest themes that runs through all the interviews is that, 
however negative their perceptions of the South African public police are in terms 
of their lack of efficiency, accountability and responsibility to other bodies (in this 
case to this private security firm), there is a paradoxical yearning to ‘be’ them.  Not 
only in the literal sense, but in the figurative and metaphorical sense.  That is, and 
using Bourdieu’s (1992) term, the “symbolic capital” that private security sees as 
flowing from the SAPS being the state-authorised governors of security. The police 
are held in the imaginations of private sector security workers as legitimate, as they 
are ‘The Police’ and endorsed under the auspices of the South African government. 
It is as if no matter how many scandals fall at the door of the police, no matter how 
little they are deemed to hold firm to their credo in terms of undertaking and 
manifesting their mandate to provide security to the people of South Africa, the 
sentiment runs deep that it is better to work for the state in the field of the 
governance of safety and security than within the ambit of private security, given 
the vagaries of the commercially-focussed and economically-driven market arena. 
 
Pertinently, this motivation to work for the SAPS is not driven by a desire to fulfil 
the mandate of the provision of security as a “thick” public good (Loader & Walker, 
2007: 167).  Rather, the mentality that predicates private security’s motivation for 
doing security is an eminently pragmatic one.  It revolves around the key exigencies 
of material survival - namely, better perks and better working conditions for 
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themselves and thus, the chance to be better providers of material resources for their 
families. 
 
These narratives are indicative of the lived experiences of people who are far 
removed from any mindfulness around what Loader, Goold & Thumala (2014: 1) 
refer to as “The moral economy of security”, that is, a model that would seek to 
‘humanise’ the private security industry with the objective of lowering workers’ 
moral dissonance around “selling goods and services [and experiencing this] as 
“morally troubling” (Ibid.,469). The implication is that, were the market for the 
buying and selling of private security to become, in Loader & White’s term, 
“civilized” (2015: 1) with the provision of private security then being refashioned 
as a public good as opposed to a good that can exclusively be accessed by those 
who can afford to pay for it. This conceptual and empirical divergence between 
these research findings and this branch of the private security literature will be 
examined and discussed now. It is now to these matters, namely, the research 
findings under this final theme of pragmatism and its implications in relation to the 
literature that I now turn.   
 
4.4. THE IMPLICATIONS OF PRAGMATISM AND THE PARADOX OF 
SECURITY   
 
What is increasingly evident throughout the presentation of these research findings is that 
they contain a ‘meta-narrative’, in that the Respondents’ mentalities are informed by a 
sense of ambivalence and ambiguity that underpins all three themes discussed here. In 
addition, these feelings of ambivalence and ambiguity have key implications on how 
these workers perform and think about their work. Put differently, ambivalence and 
ambiguity are key characteristics of their mentalities. I will now focus on this sense of 
ambivalence and ambiguity relation to the Respondents’ mentalities in relation to the 
SAPS. 
 
Each time I asked the question, “Given the opportunity, would you want to join the 
SAPS?”, the answer was in the affirmative.  This answer appeared incongruent with the 
predominantly negative view held about the police by these Respondents, as was amply 
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illustrated by the narratives and descriptions throughout the research findings.  Again, 
there emerges a seemingly paradoxical position in the mentalities of the providers of 
private security in relation to the SAPS that can perhaps be summed up through the 
analyses of the Respondents’ narratives along these lines: The police are useless, they 
are corrupt, they don’t care about the public. This is succinctly summed up: 
 
the police hey, they just sit and get ‘fat’ in their jobs and they get paid for 
doing that. (Interview 3, armed response officer, February 2017). 
 
However, given the opportunity all Respondents asserted (mostly with alacrity) that they 
would join the SAPS if given the opportunity.    
 
It is through the thematic lens of pragmatism, as expressed by this study’s Respondents, 
that the rest of this Chapter is framed, as it is here that one apprehends the extent of this 
ambivalence and ambiguity, and the emergence of a paradox can be viewed as the 
culmination of the ambivalence and ambiguity of the research findings. In addition, I will 
narrow the focus of the literature onto those studies around the mentalities of those who 
work in the private security industry, given that my research is situated in Cape Town, 
South Africa.    
 
4.4.1. A paradox? 
 
What is the aetiology of this paradoxical ‘love-hate’ relationship with the police, 
where they are deemed to be ineffectual at best and corrupt at worst…why 
would these private security workers want to join the public police? 
 
It is this paradox that provides the counterpoint to the literature on private 
security, as my research findings stand in sharp contradistinction vis-a-vis an 
appreciable amount of literature emanating largely from the United Kingdom. 
One of the main proponents of this theme of the question around a “civilizing 




…a regulatory architecture where buyers and sellers [of private security] 
are cast not only as economic actors but also as moral actors, revealing new 
avenues through which to encompass private security within the democratic 




…the market is a contested space in which public and private motivations 
jostle and collide with each other, and where commodities are judged in 
terms of their perceived  effects on a complex conception of the public 
interest, which promotes not only the prevention of market failure but also 
the promotion of good citizenship (2015: 4). 
 
In these two excerpts Loader and White (2015) call upon the private security 
market to ‘clean up its act’ on two fronts: 
 
Firstly, it calls on the sellers of private security to reframe themselves “not only 
as economic actors but as moral actors” (Loader and White, 2015: 1).  In other 
words, it challenges the sellers of private security to purge the market of 
practices that bring it into ill repute. Put differently, the market needs to be 
‘cleaned up’.  These factors include, inter alia, a tighter regulatory structure that 
cleanses the security market of unprincipled private security providers who are 
there to profit from others’ misfortune and to maximise their profit through 
whilst doing so.   
 
 Secondly, Loader & White (2015: 1) look to the buyers of private security 
services and underline the need for these services to be “cleansed” and 
“communalised”. Put differently, they proffer a proposal wherein private 
security is reconfigured as a public good - one that may be accessed in equal 
measure by all people and communities across all social-economic strata of 
society. It is thus reframed and reimagined as a democratic public good, a 
service that the population as a whole can benefit from, as opposed to a private 




However, my research findings illustrate that the “jostle and collide” to which 
Loader & White (2015: 4) refer above, has a very different meaning for the 
Respondents in my study, in that it is circumscribed by and largely limited to 
the struggle for job security. For these Respondents, the ultimate objective is to 
survive, not to attempt to “civilise the market” along the lines contemplated by 
Loader and White’s 2015 paper. The narratives described in this dissertation 
speak to the competition between their private security firm and other suburban 
firms for market share, and the quest for legitimacy though being effective, all 
in the service of better job security and (perhaps) enhanced career prospects. 
This is where the efforts of those whom I interviewed are directed: Not in the 
effort to clean up the market through cleansing it of unscrupulous operators, nor 
through the process of democratising security with the objective of assisting to 
reconfigure it as a public good. Put differently, the Respondents in my study 
want to survive the market, which is a far cry from seeking to “civilise” it as 
envisaged by Loader and White (Ibid.).  
 
Thus, the research findings speak to a different set of objectives: These workers 
feel that their jobs may be more secure if they are good at their jobs, as then the 
company for whom they work will see that they are doing a good job which may 
increase their chances of continued employment, so that they can continue to 
fulfil basic human needs such as having access to adequate food, shelter and 
electricity for themselves and their families.  
 
In sum, these narratives, descriptions and anecdotes speak to a struggle to secure 
scarce resources at the level of basic human survival needs. They provide a 
sobering illustration of how widely divergent the mentalities of the providers of 
private security are when juxtaposed with proposals that address the 
amelioration of moral ambiguity of selling security services or ways of 
reconfiguring the market so as to civilize it as contemplated in Loader & White’s 
2015 paper. Instead, as stated, these interviews foreground a more basic human 




4.4.2. The ‘civilizing imperative’ versus ‘the need to survive’ - a tale of  two 
contexts  
 
Whilst Loader and White’s proposal as articulated in their 2014 and 2015 
journal articles is eminently laudable, it is, in the context of the research findings 
in relation to the people whom I interviewed, somewhat of a “pipedream”. It is 
within this context that Loader and White’s postulation of a “civilizing model 
of regulation” (2015: 1), when viewed in terms of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs 
(Maslow, 1942) so far up the pyramid as to be virtually out of sight to the private 
security worker trying to make a living amid the current social, political and 
economic milieu of South Africa. Again, and using Loader and White’s 2015 
journal article as a counterpoint, wherein they assert that, 
 
While we appreciate that these observations [of the civilizing factor at 
work] are rooted in the United Kingdom case, this combination of economic 
and moral agency can certainly be found in other markets… (2015: 4). 
 
In summation, when these research findings are contextualised within South 
Africa, descriptions and narratives that at first appear to be characterised with 
marked elements of ambivalence and ambiguity are in fact neither of these 
things, within the context of the mentalities of those whom I interviewed. Put 
differently, certain elements of the mentalities of the providers of private 
security that initially struck me as paradoxical start to make sense once the 
background and context of these actors in this are fully appreciated. This is 
especially evident in the juxtaposition between the way these Respondents view 
their occupational lot regarding the way the public police are both imagined and 
experienced by them. 
 
One of the strongest themes that runs through all the responses in the interviews 
is that, however negative the Respondents’ perceptions of the South African 
public police are in terms of the SAPS’s lack of efficiency, accountability and 
cooperation with other bodies (in this case in relation those who work in this 
private security firm), there is a paradoxical yearning to ‘be’ them.  Not only in 
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the literal sense, but in the figurative and metaphorical sense to which the 
interviewees referred.  The police are held in the imaginations of private sector 
security workers as legitimate, as they are ‘The Police’.  It is as if no matter how 
many scandals fall at the door of the police, and no matter how little they are 
deemed to hold firm to their credo in terms of undertaking and making good on 
their state-endorsed mandate to provide ‘security’ for all the people of South 
Africa, they are legitimate, despite their ‘uselessness’.  
 
 
In addition, there is an air of resignation around the lack of commitment that 
those interviewed attribute to the (lack of) work ethic of the police. And so, in 
the face of this, the paradox intriguing as it may first seem, is ultimately 
completely understandable.  The police are slated for their lack of adherence to 
and manifestation of the “serve and protect ethic”.  However, the concomitant 
sentiment amongst the Respondents is that, should they land a job in the police 
services in South Africa, they would adjust their ‘better’ private security 




As Respondent 2 commented:  
 
And also, how can it [the SAPS] ever be called a police service? It can’t be 
a service, there is no ‘service’ there.” (Interview 2, operations manager, 
February 2017).  
 
In all, the research findings presented here speak to the primacy of market forces 
as the motivators for service excellence in the provision of private security, as 
opposed to a mindfulness of moral ambivalence as described in Loader, Goold 
and Thumala (2014). Nor do these findings illustrate a drive towards a 
regulatory paradigm aimed at “civilizing” the market as contemplated in Loader 
& White’s 2015 paper, one that would comprise a “new democratic promise of 




On the contrary, the research findings presented here speak to the daily struggle 





Chapter Four presented and discussed this study’s findings and elucidated several themes 
that were drawn out in the examination and analysis of the data. It did so by illustrating 
the mentalities of the Respondents using their own words, to capture the ‘immediacy’ of 
their views in relation to the work that they do, and how they think and feel about this 
work. Several points of confluence and divergence with the literature on private security 
were illustrated.  
 
The final chapter of this dissertation will provide an overview of the research findings 
alongside an examination of some of the questions that flow from it. It will also include 
a brief discussion of what private security as a public good might look like from a 
normative perspective within the context of this study’s findings. 
5. CONCLUSION   
 
5.1. This concluding chapter provides an overview of the research findings. In addition, it 
examines and discusses several key implications of my findings and poses some 
questions around what forms the democratic provision of private security might take in 
South Africa, where the majority of those who are most in need of private security are 
economically barred from accessing this service. Finally, it provides a set of contours 
and processes that explore what may be more effective and democratic ways of 
providing private security in South Africa in the light of the research findings presented 
in this study. It does so through asking, inter alia, three key questions:  
 
Firstly, how can and should public goods be provided by plural policing arrangements 
where the public police no longer have the monopoly on policing?  Secondly, it will 
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examine and discuss some key effects that the current state of private security may have 
on moulding the mentalities of those who work in it. Thirdly, it will look at some 
normative issues with respect to the accountability that currently accrues to the private 
security industry, and it asks what changes could be made to ensure a more democratic 
dispensation regarding the provision of private security. 
 
 
Further, through providing an overview of my exploration of the mentalities of the 
providers of private security, some of the main concerns and aspirations of those who 
participated in this study illustrate the foundation upon which their mentalities are 
constructed. Perhaps these concerns, aspirations (and, indeed, questions) may provide 
some grist for the mill in terms of further research in this field. 
 
5.2. Some observations and questions arising out of this study 
 
In summary, what my research has found is that private security is more effective than 
the public sector (they’re often called to a crime scene - potential or after-the fact - before 
the SAPS are, if indeed the SAPS are called at all). They view themselves as more 
legitimate, a view that is often also held by the general public, (see, for instance, Cooper-
Knock, 2016). This legitimacy derives not from any moralistic or civilising values as 
Loader and White (2015) and Loader, Goold and Thumala (2014) hold. Instead what 
informs their praxis within the remit of the provision of security is that they perceive 
themselves as more effective than the SAPS. However, the paradox is that although the 
SAPS are looked down upon for their inefficiency, they are also envied for their “element 
of statehood” (White, 2010: 183). It is this ‘state-ness’ that makes the public police 
appear, at least in the eyes of the Respondents in this study, more legitimate, albeit that 
the public police are deemed to be useless. Importantly, they are envied because they 
appear to have better job security, better working conditions and a wider range of job 
perks.   
 
Within the context of Loader & White’s 2015 paper on the recalibration of the private 
security market through their dual proposals of “cleansing the market of dishonourable 
sellers and/or communalizing the market for disempowered buyers” (2015: 5, italics in 
original), some key questions arise.  For example, what shifts in theory, underlying 
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conceptualisations and regulatory practices might the private security industry be tasked 
to undertake to make the provision of security a commodity that is a public good reaching 
into the lives of all people, instead of being a luxury commodity?  Can a market for 
private security make the requisite shifts to ensure that security service providers act in 
the public interest by rendering services that are characterised by transparency, 
accountability and equity?  
 
Currently, The Private Security Regulatory Industry Act No 56 of 2001 (The Act) looks 
at accountability from a normative, state-centred regulatory position. Could it build in 
accountability and facilitate private security actors in taking responsibility to achieve a 
flatter, more equitable structure that delivers job security and transparent and equitable 
employment practices across the broad range of organisations that have a stake in the 
provision of security? An important consideration is whether this would be within the 
state’s remit to do so, as it currently is?  If not, to whom might this duty be devolved and 
effectively actioned to improve the status quo regarding the provision of democratic and 
effective private security services that protect the workers in this industry? 
 
Perhaps a regulatory system that is recalibrated so as to build in local expertise with 
centralised knowledge may be a positive shift in terms of reimagining private security 
as a public good. In light of these considerations, Berg and Nouveau (2011) propose a 
regulatory model that provides a different configuration of regulation that may be more 
conducive to moving away from an hierarchical ‘top-down’ regulatory structure to one 
that is modelled on a nodal system, where both state and non-state actors participate in 
the creation of regulatory systems allow for the  ‘building-in’ of  capacity for the 
democratic, efficient and transparent provisions of security that are currently outside of 
the ambit of the Private Security Industry Regulatory Act No. 56 of 2001:  
 
 
Given the plurality of policing of public spaces, and in fact in the private realm as well, 
perhaps there should be a focus on the functions of policing rather than on the 
institutions of  policing.  In this way. Instead of having discrete regulatory bodies for 
each institution, one could have regulatory bodies or even one overarching regulatory 
body with representation from state and non-state institutions, aimed at specific 




In the South African context, Shearing (2003) recounts his example of how security 
was provided to the socioeconomically disadvantaged people of Zwelethemba on the 
outskirts of the Cape Town metropole. An empirical example of the reconfiguration of 
regulation of private security proposed by Berg and Nouveau (2011) is that of the 
example of Zwelethemba as described in Johnston and Shearing (2003) wherein 
Shearing participated in a system of the provision of security that is built on local 
knowledge and capacity and provides security as a public good in an equitable, 
transparent and effective way.  The Zwelethemba model is an illustration that points to 
and demonstrates that the provision of private security in the Global South (looking to 
the South African example in this case) may not be so easily transferable from Loader’s 
Eurocentric or global North “civilising” (2015: 1) model onto Africa in general and in 
the South African context specifically.  Shearing’s (2003) work details the provision of 
security that is predicated upon democratic tenets and framed within his nodal concept 
and operationalisation of security governance. Broadly speaking, and following on from 
this model, the research of Albrecht and Moe (2014), and of Berg, Nakueira and 
Shearing (2014) when looking the provision of security in certain countries on the 
African continent again illustrates the utility of a nodal framing of the provision of 
security across a landscape populated by both state and non-state security providers. 
 
Another way of recalibrating the current state-focussed ‘top-down’ system where the 
state remains the apex actor in the provision and implementation of security (Loader & 
White’s 2007 concept of state-anchored pluralism as described in Chapter Two), is that 
of Policing Commissions (and other types of enquires of a similar ilk) - where the public 
have a platform on which to voice their concerns and their ideas as to what they feel 
would work for them in their communities regarding the provision of security. In the case 
of the Khayelitsha Commission of 2013/2014 the SAPS were deemed, by the people they 
are mandated to police, as ineffective and lacking legitimacy. Policing Commissions 
provide a platform for conversations between (amongst other parties) the citizens who 
live in a geographical space; in tandem with those whose remit is to police them.  Again, 
what is key here is that local resources and local knowledge are employed to address the 
multitude of problems experienced by the people who live with the daily consequences 






5.3. How does this relate to the research findings in this study? 
 
The very same questions and problems faced by the poor in South Africa, who ironically 
have the least access to private security whilst having the greatest need for it, and whose 
lived experience is largely circumscribed by the social morbidity and myriad 
depredations that flow from poverty; are those questions and problems that this study 
describes as informing the mentalities of the providers of private security. All three 
themes mapped in the research findings in Chapter Four speak to issues of job security 
and the overriding injunction to be employed (whatever the ‘cost’ to self and family) in 
order to survive. This fundamental need is juxtaposed with the exploration of several 
normative issues of what private security perhaps ‘should or could look like’ through a 
regulatory lens based on principles that view private security as a “‘thick’ public good” 
(Loader & Walker, 2007: 144) and again highlights the ‘disconnect’ that is precipitated 
by a first world solutioning of third world concerns.  
 
It is at this intersection that my findings diverge from the literature as espoused by Loader 
and White’s 2015 proposals, and a key finding that flows from my research emerges: The 
provision of private security in the Global South (looking to the South African example 
in this case) may not be so easily transferable from Loader’s Eurocentric or global North 
model onto the global South in general and, in particular, in the context of South Africa. 
This study foregrounds the need to find African solutions for African problems, and on 
the level of this study, to find South African solutions to South African problems. As 
mentioned, this points to the usefulness of adopting a nodal framing that better 
contextualises the concerns of private security when viewed from the perspective of 
Africa.  
 
Put differently, my findings illustrate the lack of viability that results from an attempt to 
address global South contexts within the framework of global North normative 
dominance. This highlights the necessity of understanding private security in South 
Africa in the light of its unique context. In addition, my choice of the nodal analytic as 
the research framework is conducive to this understanding, given that the nodal 
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framework eschews and is not circumscribed by a set of pre-existing normative 
postulates. 
 
In sum, the mentalities of those who provide private security highlight how tenuous their 
hold on maintaining a baseline of foundational human needs is. Given the findings as 
presented in this study, and in addition to the questions posed earlier in this concluding 
Chapter, these are the questions that need to be asked:  How can job security in the South 
African private security industry be maximised? What needs to be done to alleviate the 
social comorbidity that arises from institutionalised poverty such as that in South Africa, 
where fifty percent of the population live below the bread line? This statistic was reported 
on television (News Night, 2017). What protective factors can be built into vulnerable 
and poverty-stricken communities to facilitate a more robust socio-economic scaffolding 
to mitigate against poverty and the problems that flow from it? These are the communities 
where ninety percent of this study’s Respondents live.  
 
Indeed, the questions posed here are equally applicable to an examination of the equitable 
and transparent provision of private security to the poor; as they are to the equitability 
and transparency of the regulation and governance of the private security industry. Given 
this context, perhaps the place to start is to ask the workers in the private security industry 
(particularly those who are at the highest risk for the myriad social, economic and 
political harms and thus constitute some of the most dangerous and the most vulnerable 
urban spaces in South Africa) what they believe will work in their communities.  This 
embraces a nodal, polycentric (many-centred) ‘from-the-ground-up’ approach which can 
be augmented by a ‘top-down’ that is, from the state, approach.  The point here is that 
the provision of job security that serves the interests of the private security as a public 
good does not necessarily lie in an ‘either-or’ solution, but in fact in an ‘and-and’ set of 
solutions culminating from numerous conversations and inputs from myriad state and 
non-state actors. 
 
5.4. A concluding thought 
 
Given the argument I present on the back of my research findings in terms of finding 
South African solutions to South African problems, the irony of concluding this 
dissertation with a quotation from the policing scholar Robert Reiner, who lives and 
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works in the global North, is not lost on me. However, his words encapsulate the nexus 
of the issue and they speak to the heart of this study: “All the policing classics tell us that 
policing cannot deliver peace if deep social cleavages militate against it” (Reiner, 2015: 
324).  
 
The aim of this study is to illustrate just how deeply these social cleavages cut, along 
with the profound effect these cleavages have on shaping the mentalities of those who 
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PARTICIPANT OVERVIEW: FORMAL INTERVIEWS 
 




Security Guards (Static 
[stationary] 
and 
Patrolling) Guards:  





















Office Management: Male Coloured 
  
Afrikaans 1 
Owner: Male White  Afrikaans 1 
TOTAL PARTICIPANTS:    10 
 
 








   
APPENDIX B 
 
LIST OF FORMAL INTERVIEWS 
 
 
Interview 1 Private Security Company 
Owner/Manager 
February 2017 
Interview 2 Operations manager February 2017 
Interview 3 Armed response officer  February 2017 
Interview 4 Control room operator/ 
dispatcher 
February 2017 
Interview 5 Armed response officer  February 2017 
Interview 6 Control room operator/ 
Dispatcher 
February 2017 
Interview 7 Control room operator/ 
dispatcher 
March 2017 
Interview 8 Guard (patrolling) March 2017 
Interview 9 Guard (static and patrolling) March 2017 
Interview 10 Guard (static and patrolling) March 2017 
Notes: 
1.  All Respondents (2-10) are employed by and work for the same private security firm. 









Standardised Open-Ended questions 
1. What is your job title? 
2. What does a typical workday look like for you? 
3. How did you get this job? 
4. How long have you been working at this security company? 
5. Is there anything that you enjoy the most about this job? 
6. Is there anything that you dislike the most about this job? 
7. Did you have any training before you started this job? 
8. Did the training you received, if any, help you to do your job? 
9. Have you had any on-the-job training, either at this company, or at any other private 
security company you may have worked for in the past? 
10. If you have not received training, would you go if a training course was offered to you 
to attend? 
11. What happens if you or one of your colleagues makes a mistake at work?  
12. Do you get feedback on your work performance - what you are doing well, and areas 
in which you could improve? 
13. Who gives you this kind of feedback? 
14. Do you have problems with other colleagues in this job? 
15. If yes, are problems sorted out?   
16. If there are problems at work, who helps you to sort the problems out? 
17. Are you satisfied with the working conditions of your job, such as the number of 
shifts you work per month, or the hours of the shifts that you work? 
18. Do you talk to anyone you work with about work problems you may face? 
19. Who would you talk to about any personal problems you may face? 
20. Who would you talk to about any financial problems you may face? 
21. Do you have regular meetings with your supervisor/s? 
22. If no - would you like to have regular meetings with your supervisors? 
23. Do you talk at these meetings? 
87 
 
24. If yes - do you feel that the issues you raise at these meetings are taken seriously? If 
no, why do you not talk at meetings?  
25. Do you have meetings with anyone else, other than your supervisor, in the company? 
26. If yes, do you find these meetings helpful to you? 
27. If no, what could you do to make these meetings more helpful to you? 
28. Is your job dangerous? 
29. Other than training, do you feel that you are given enough resources - for example, 
the proper uniform, proper shoes, enough clothing for night shifts and in the winter 
months? 
30. Do you need to carry a firearm when you do this job? 
31. If yes, how do you feel about carrying a firearm? 
32. Do you carry any other weapons or equipment that can help you to protect yourself in 
your job? 
33. Who do you call for back-up if you are in a potentially dangerous situation? 
34. Does back up arrive quick enough for you? 
35. Have you had to deal with members of the SAPS (South African Police Services) in 
the line of duty? 
36. If yes, how do you feel about your relationship with the SAPS?  
37. If you were offered a job at another security company would you take it? 
38. If you were offered a job in the SAPS would you take it? 
39. If yes, why? If no, why?  
40. Do you have any perks in your job - for example: pension fund, medical aid or bonus 
pay? 
41. How long does it take you to get to work? 
42. Who pays for your transport costs to and from work? 
43. Are you able to change your shift hours if you need to?  
44. If you could change one thing about your job, what would you change? 
45. Is there anything else you want to tell me about your job, that you have not spoken 












Informal conversational interviews 
 
I used this list of questions during the ‘ride-along’ with the armed response officer, both with 
him and with the employees with whom I spoke at the various sites we visited. This list 
facilitated my staying on topic and steering the conversation back on track when we went off 
topic: 
 
1. How often do you visit each of the company’s sites during a single shift? 
2. Do you feel that your clients respect the service you provide for them? 
3. How would you describe your relationship with the general public (other than your 
clients) if you deal with them? 
4. If you look back over the last month, approximately how many times have you 
involved the SAPS (South African Police Services) in an incident to which you have 
had to attend? 
5. How would you describe your relationship with the SAPS? 
6. What is the procedure if you receive a call from your control room? 
7. Do you feel that the control room operator gives you enough detail about the situation 
you are being called to sort out? 
8. If not, do you feel free to request further information? 
9. If you arrive at a scene and you feel you require back-up to deal with the situation, 
who do you call for back-up? 
10. Is there any further information that you would like to share with me that you haven’t 
shared yet? 
